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First Impressions 
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the 
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of issues of first impression 
identified by a federal court of appeals opinion announced between 
January 31, 2007 and October 31, 2007. This collection is organized by 
circuit. 
Each summary presents an issue of first impression, a brief 
analysis, and the court’s conclusion. It is intended to give only the 
briefest synopsis of the first impression issue, not a comprehensive 
analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will 
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point. If a circuit 
does not appear on this list, it means that the editors did not identify any 
cases from that circuit for the specified time period that presented an 
issue of First Impression. 
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FIRST CIRCUIT 
United States v. Gil-Carmona, 497 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act’s 
“requirement that a ‘vessel [be] subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States’ was an essential element of the crime to be determined by a jury, 
rather than by a judge, as mandated by Congress in section 70504(a).” Id. 
at 54. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “[a] defendant’s claim that his 
constitutional rights were violated by the removal of an element of the 
charged offense from the jury’s consideration is ordinarily reviewed for 
harmless error.” Id. at 55. Following this standard, the court examined 
“whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a 
contrary finding with regard to the omitted element.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit concluded “that the jury would have 
found . . . [the defendant] guilty even if the question of jurisdiction . . . 
had been submitted to them, rendering any error in failing to do so 
harmless.” Id. 
 
E. Sav. Bank v. Lafata, 483 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the Bankruptcy Code’s protection of 
mortgage lenders against modification of claims secured by a principal 
residence” applied when the residence lay mostly “on a lot abutting the 
mortgaged property.” Id. at 15.   
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit noted that, “[i]n Nobleman, the 
Supreme Court held that [section] 1322(b)(2) barred modification of the 
entire claim—secured and unsecured portions—if the claim is secured by 
the debtor’s principal residence.” Id. at 18. Because the lender did not 
dispute the Bankruptcy Court’s finding that the encroachment is not “the 
main part, the principal part, or even an important part of the . . . 
residence,” the court next analyzed “whether even some nominal 
encroachment by a debtor’s principal residence on a mortgaged property 
will trigger the anti-modification protections of [section] 1322(b)(2).” Id. 
at 19. The court first examined the language of the statute, noting that 
“[t]he key phrase in the statute is ‘secured only by a security interest in 
real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.’” Id.  
The court recognized that the language of the statute was 
ambiguous as to whether this was satisfied “when a party actually resides 
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mostly on the adjacent property.” Id. at 20. The court therefore examined 
the legislative history of section 1322(b)(2), which it had previously 
reviewed in Lomas Mortgage, Inc. v. Louis, and concluded that “the most 
that could be said of the legislative history was that Congress wanted to 
benefit the residential mortgage market as opposed to the entire real 
estate mortgage market.” Id. The court next stated that “[t]his policy of 
preferring mortgage lenders to other lenders in bankruptcy does not 
necessarily extend to those cases where the lender has failed to exercise 
reasonable due diligence.” Id. The court stated that under these 
circumstances, holding in favor of the creditor would create a “windfall” 
for the bank and “[g]iven its lack of due diligence, we see no reason why 
the result should be otherwise.” Id. at 21. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that “the anti-modification 
provisions of section 1322(b)(2) will not apply if the debtor’s principal 
residence only encroaches on the mortgaged property.” Id. at 21. 
 
Wood v. Spencer, 487 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether a petitioner’s lack of due diligence disposed 
of a habeas petition regarding a state-created impediment inquiry. Id. at 
6. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the section in question, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(1)(B), focused “on government conduct and does not contain 
an explicit diligence requirement,” though such a requirement was 
included in a different section of the same statute. Id. But the court held 
that “all words and provisions of statutes are intended to have meaning 
and are to be given effect,” and should be interpreted so as not to make a 
word or phrase therein superfluous.” Id. at 7. To not impute a diligence 
requirement would “. . . fail[] to give meaning to the second clause of the 
statutory provision. That clause demands that a state-created impediment 
must, to animate the limitations-extending exception, ‘prevent’ a prisoner 
from filing for federal habeas relief.” Id. The court considered the 
petitioner’s available alternatives to be “of considerable relevance.” Id. 
The 1st Circuit noted that “the person who has notice that information 
exists and ready access to it hardly can blame his inaction on the state’s 
failure to deliver the information to him.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “[O]n the facts of this case, the Commonwealth’s 
conduct cannot fairly be said to have been the obstacle that prevented 
Wood from filing for federal habeas relief.” Id. at 8. 
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Torres-Negrn v. J & N Records, LLC, 504 F.3d 151 (1st Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether a reconstruction of an original work from 
memory constituted a “copy” within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 408(b). 
Id. at 157. 
ANALYSIS: The court determined “[t]he statutory definition of 
‘copy’ provides little guidance.” Id. The court further noted that in 
accordance with dictionary definitions, a reconstruction varies from a 
copy in that it is created without an original. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit concluded that without first-hand 
access to the original, a reconstruction did not constitute a “copy” 
sufficient to satisfy 17 U.S.C. § 408(b). Id. at 163. 
 
Mellen v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 504 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “Whether [under the Family Medical Leave Act] 
holidays were to be counted against intermittent leave taken in an 
interval of a week or more.” Id. at 25. 
ANALYSIS: The court examined “the intersection of certain FMLA 
regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 825.200(f) and 29 C.F.R. § 825.205(a), 
pertaining to proper allocation of intermittent leave” and determined that 
the provisions “fit together naturally.” Id. at 23, 25. Section 825.200(f) 
provided that “the fact that a holiday [occurred] within the week taken as 
FMLA leave ha[d] no effect” on the calculation of the “amount of leave 
used” by an employee. Id. at 25. Section 825.205(a) established that 
“only the ‘amount of leave actually taken’” by an employee taking 
intermittent leave could “be counted against the twelve-week 
entitlement.” Id. The court concluded that “[t]he ‘amount of leave 
actually taken’ to which section 825.205(a) refers is the ‘amount of leave 
used’ defined in section 825.200(f).” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “if an employee’s intermittent 
leave includes a full, holiday-containing week, section 825.200(f) 
provides that the ‘amount of leave used’ includes the holiday.” Id. 
 
Mejia-Orellana v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether an alien that has “acquired his ‘lawful 
permanent resident status’ by fraud or misrepresentation” had been 
lawfully admitted and is therefore eligible for cancellation of removal. 
Id. at 14. 
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit initially acknowledged that “[i]n order 
to be eligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), an 
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alien must . . . have been ‘lawfully admitted for permanent residence for 
not less than five years.’” Id. at 15–16. The court’s next logical inquiry 
was whether admissions acquired through fraud and misrepresentation is 
included within the meaning of “lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence.” Id. at 16. The court followed the BIA precedent, that when 
aliens “have acquired permanent resident status by fraud or 
misrepresentation, because they have not been lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence,” they are denied 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (a) protection. 
Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that because the alien acquired 
permanent resident status through fraud and misrepresentation, the alien 
was never ‘lawfully admitted for permanent residence’ and was 
ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (a). Id. at 
16–17. 
 
UPS Cap. Bus. Credit v. Gencarelli, 501 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether or not a commercial lender had a “right to 
receive a bargained-for prepayment penalty from a solvent debtor.” Id. at 
2. 
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit held that section 502 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, rather than section 506(b), must be used to govern the allowance 
of claims. Id. at 5. As such, the Bankruptcy Code does not allow a 
solvent debtor to be relieved of prepayment obligations unless a section 
502 exception applies. Id. at 8. The court noted that where a debtor is 
solvent, bankruptcy law holds that courts must enforce contractual 
provisions that are deemed valid under state law. Id. at 7. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit examined policy and other circuit 
courts’ precedents to allow “claims for prepayment penalties as 
unsecured claims, even if the penalties are deemed unreasonable, so long 
as they are valid under section 502.” Id. 
 
United States v. Brown, 500 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether, for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), 
‘attempt’ offenses are considered ‘felony drug offenses’” and, therefore, 
may count as predicate offenses on which to base a recidivist sentencing 
enhancement. Id. at 51. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that here, the statutory scheme 
contained “specific penalty provisions applicable to recidivist drug 
offenders,” providing that persons “convicted under section 841(a)(1) 
‘after two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense have 
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become final . . . shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of life 
imprisonment without release.’” Id. at 59. The court interpreted “felony 
drug offense” under its applicable statute, as “an offense that is 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the 
United States or of a State or foreign country that prohibits or restricts 
conduct relating to narcotic drugs.” Id. The court noted that, per the 
relevant statute, the attempt criteria of felony and imprisonment were 
met.  Id. The court found that “relate” in this context means “show or 
establish a logical or causal connection between.” Id. at 60. The court 
interpreted this broad definition as a congressional mandate to “treat 
inchoate offenses with as much gravity as the substantive offenses that 
underlie them,” and cited case law concluding that “possession with 
intent to distribute qualifies as a ‘serious offense.’” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that, “[u]nder section 841(b)(1), the 
term ‘felony drug offense’ includes crimes [such as attempt crimes] that 
do not involve outright possession of narcotic drugs.” Id. 
 
United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether requiring an individual on supervised release 
to provide a blood sample, for purposes of creating a DNA profile and 
entering it into a centralized database, violated the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 2–3. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that this case required a balancing of 
the government’s interest in “monitoring and rehabilitating supervised 
releasees, solving crimes, and exonerating innocent individuals” and the 
defendant’s privacy interest. Id. at 14. The court noted that supervised 
releasees have a “substantially diminished expectation of privacy.” Id. at 
11. Further, the court explained that the government has a compelling 
interest in maintaining a record of the identities of supervised releasees 
because they “are more likely to commit future criminal offenses than 
are average citizens.” Id. at 13. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that the government’s interest 
in “monitoring and rehabilitating supervised releasees” outweighed the 
defendant’s privacy interest, “given his status as a supervised releasee, 
the relatively minimal inconvenience occasioned by a blood draw, and 
the coding of genetic information that, by statute, may be used only for 
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SECOND CIRCUIT 
Vadas v. United States, No. 06-2087-pr, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 10348 
(2d Cir. May 3, 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the government’s “filing and later withdrawal 
of an Amended Second-Offender Information” pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 
851, “rendered null and void the originally filed Second-Offender 
Information.” Id. at 14. 
ANALYSIS: The court initially explained that section 851 prohibits a 
court from imposing an enhanced sentence “unless the government 
files—before trial or the entry of a guilty plea—an information with the 
court specifying in writing the earlier convictions upon which the 
enhancement rests.” Id. at 3. The court stated that the notice requirement 
of section 851 “reflects, essentially, two goals, first ‘to allow the 
defendant to contest the accuracy of the information,’ and second ‘to 
allow defendant to have ample time to determine whether to enter a plea 
or go to trial and plan his trial strategy with full knowledge of the 
consequences of a potential guilty verdict.’” Id. at 17. The court reasoned 
that there was “no doubt that the filing of the [original] Second-Offender 
Information provided Vadas with notice that was adequate to allow him 
to accept (or to prepare to challenge) a sentence enhancement based on a 
previous conviction.” Id. at 20. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “the purposes of section 
851 were fulfilled through the original filing of the information, and . . . 
this filing remained effective” despite the withdrawal of the Amended 
Second-Offender Information. Id. at 21. 
 
Weber v. United States, 484 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the 2nd Circuit should exercise its jurisdiction 
over a direct appeal from the Bankruptcy Court as authorized by section 
1233 of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), which confers jurisdiction on the courts of 
appeals in such circumstances, but grants them discretion to accept or 
decline the direct appeal. Id. at 157. 
ANALYSIS: The court agreed with the purpose of section 1233 of 
the BAPCPA that “on appeals that raise controlling questions of law, 
concern matters of public importance, and arise under circumstances 
where a prompt, determinative ruling might avoid needless litigation.” 
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Id. at 158. Accordingly, the court held that “the Court of Appeals would 
be most likely to exercise its discretion to “permit direct appeal where 
there [was] uncertainty in the bankruptcy courts,” or where the court 
found it “patently obvious that the Bankruptcy Court’s decision [was] 
either manifestly correct or incorrect.” Id. at 161. However, the court 
also ruled that it would be “reluctant to accept cases for direct appeal” 
when a decision would benefit from percolation through the district 
court. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit declined to exercise its discretion to 
hear the direct appeal in this case because there was no showing that 
evaluation of the Bankruptcy Court’s decision at that time would have 
led to a more rapid resolution of the case, since the decision did not 
appear to be either manifestly correct or manifestly incorrect. Id. 
 
United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 487 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 
2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether there can be a Sixth Amendment violation 
when the only attorney-client communication prohibited was 
communication about the defendant’s testimony.” Id. at 132. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “all of the federal circuit courts 
that have considered the issue have concluded that under Perry and 
Geders a district court may not order a defendant to refrain from 
discussing his ongoing testimony with counsel during an overnight 
recess, even if all other communication is allowed.” Id. The court ruled 
“that an order banning the defendant from discussing his testimony with 
counsel during an overnight recess is unconstitutional because it has the 
effect of prohibiting a wide range of discussions that under Geders are 
constitutionally protected.” Id. The court reasoned that “while the judge 
may instruct the lawyer not to coach his client, he may not forbid all 
‘consideration of the defendant’s ongoing testimony’ during a substantial 
recess.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “a restriction on 
communication during a long recess can violate the Sixth Amendment 
even if the restriction bars discussion only of the defendant’s testimony.” 
Id. at 133. 
 
Belot v. Burge, 490 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the court should apply a de novo or abuse of 
discretion standard of review when reviewing a district court’s denial of 
equitable tolling as an exercise of its discretion as to a petition under the 
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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Id. 
at 205. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted “if a district court denies equitable 
tolling on the belief that the decision was compelled by law, that the 
governing legal standards would not permit equitable tolling in the 
circumstances—that aspect of the decision should be reviewed de novo. 
If the decision to deny tolling was premised on an incorrect or inaccurate 
view of what the law requires, the decision should not stand. Courts 
generally in such circumstances state that application of an incorrect 
standard of law is an ‘abuse of discretion.’” Id. at 206. 
CONCLUSION: The court reviewed “the discretionary ground for 
abuse of discretion” and found that “this decision was within the district 
court’s reasonable discretionary parameters.” Id. at 207. 
 
State Employees Bargaining Agent Coalition v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71 
(2d Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the legislative elimination of a job position 
precluded “a plaintiff’s claim of an ongoing violation of federal law 
under [the] Ex parte Young” exception to Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity. Id. at 98. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by noting that under Ex parte Young, 
plaintiffs can sue state officials acting in their official capacities for 
“prospective, injunctive relief,” as long as plaintiffs allege “‘ongoing 
violation[s] of federal law.’” Id. at 95. Rejecting the appellants’ 
contention that the elimination of the job positions in question had also 
eliminated the requisite ongoing violations, the court found that 
plaintiffs’ properly claimed that the state’s actions were both ongoing 
and “potentially curable by prospective relief.” Id. at 96–97. First, the 
court explained that despite the elimination of the plaintiffs’ job 
positions, the plaintiffs could still claim ongoing harm since they 
remained without jobs. Id. at 97. Second, the court found that relief such 
as reinstatement or the creation of new positions could properly address 
the alleged ongoing violations. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the elimination of a job position 
allegedly “in violation of plaintiffs’ rights [was] nevertheless ‘ongoing’ 
for the purposes of the Ex parte Young exception” to the Eleventh 
Amendment. Id. at 96. 
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Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether one joint owner of a copyright can 
retroactively transfer his ownership by a written instrument, and thereby 
cut off the accrued rights of the other owner to sue for infringement.” Id. 
at 97. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit distinguished this case from the cases 
relied upon by the district court “insofar as they involved retroactive 
licenses granted pursuant to negotiated settlements of accrued 
infringement claims.” Id. at 101. The court explained the differences 
between settlements and licenses, stating that a “settlement agreement 
can only waive or extinguish claims held by a settling owner; it can have 
no effect on co-owners who are not parties to the settlement agreement. . 
. . Licenses and assignments, however, are prospective; they permit use 
by a non-owner who would not otherwise have a right to use the 
property.” Id. at 102–103. The court found that permitting retroactive 
licenses or assignments would eliminate a co-owner’s right to sue for 
infringement and would violate “the fundamental principle of contract 
law prohibiting the parties to a contract from binding nonparties.” Id. at 
103. Finally, the court listed “(1) the need for predictability and certainty 
and (2) discouragement of infringement” as two policy reasons against 
retroactive licenses or assignments. Id. at 105. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “such retroactive transfers 
violate basic principles of tort and contract law, and undermine the 
policies embodied by the Copyright Act.” Id. at 97–98. 
 
Osario-Pedreros v. Keisler, 503 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether an agency abused its discretion by not 
granting a continuance “when a petitioner’s I-130 petition has been 
denied by the District Director but an appeal of that decision is still 
pending in front of the BIA.” Id. at 165. 
ANALYSIS: The court determined “[t]he BIA clearly grounded its 
holding not only on the fact that the District Director had denied the I-
130 petition, but also on its finding, fully supported by the record, that 
Osario-Pedreros had failed to provide any meaningful argument or 
evidence as to why the District Director’s decision was erroneous.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “the agency’s refusal to 
grant a continuance was not an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 166. 
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Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 500 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 
2007) 
QUESTION: Whether a contractual waiver of a jury trial was 
“effective against a claim that the contract containing the waiver was 
induced by fraud.” Id. at 188. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit stated that if a party alleges an agreed-
upon dispute resolution provision was procured by fraud, “the fairest 
course is to afford that litigant the protections he would have enjoyed had 
he never been fraudulently induced to forsake them by contract.” Id. 
However, “a contractual waiver is enforceable if it is made knowingly, 
intentionally, and voluntarily.” Id. If the party does not view the 
provision as a product of fraud, the court then found there is no reason to 
discard the agreed-upon manner of dispute resolution. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court joined the 10th Circuit in holding that 
“unless a party alleges that its agreement to waive its right to a jury trial 
was itself induced by fraud, the party’s contractual waiver is enforceable 
vis-à-vis an allegation of fraudulent inducement relating to the contract 
as a whole.” Id. 
 
THIRD CIRCUIT 
Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether an erroneously released prisoner [was] 
entitled to credit for time spent at liberty.” Id. at 313. 
ANALYSIS: The court found no violation of due process and 
concluded that “credit for time spent at liberty is [not] among those 
‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all 
our civil and political institutions.’” Id. at 317. The court identified three 
interests important to the determination of whether an released prisoner 
should be granted credit for the time he was at liberty: (1) “simple 
fairness toward the prisoner”, (2) “limit[ing] the capricious exercise of 
governmental power”, and (3) “society’s interest in convicted criminals 
serving out their sentences.” Id. at 318. 
CONCLUSION: The court established a two-part test and held that 
an erroneously released prisoner is entitled to credit for time spent at 
liberty if “he can bring forth facts indicating that he was released despite 
having unserved time remaining” and if the government fails to prove 
either that “the imprisoning sovereign was not negligent, or vicariously 
negligent, or that the prisoner, in any way, affirmatively effectuated his 
release or prevented his re-apprehension.” Id. at 323. 
70 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 4:59 
Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a husband may qualify for asylum on the 
well-founded fear that his wife may be persecuted under a coercive 
population control policy.” Id. at 103. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “[t]he spouse of an asylee may 
obtain derivative asylum status under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3), but the 
provision for derivative asylum does not allow one spouse to stand in the 
shoes of the other and to independently obtain asylum based on a threat 
to the other spouse.” Id. at 105. The court assessed the Board of 
Immigration Appeal’s (“BIA”) interpretation of the controlling statute 
concluding that the BIA “exercised its delegated gap-filling authority 
reasonably,” and was not unreasonable “in holding . . . that the scope of 
the harm resulting from the enforcement of a population-control policy 
by forced abortion and involuntary sterilization extends to both spouses. 
Id. at 108. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit “established that a petitioner may 
qualify for asylum on the basis of a well-founded fear that his spouse 
may face forced abortion or sterilization.” Id. at 109. 
 
Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 482 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the common-law “fiduciary exception” to the 
attorney-client privilege extended to all statutory fiduciaries, such as 
those created by ERISA. Id. at 230. 
ANALYSIS: The court first surveyed the history of attorney-client 
privilege and the fiduciary exception in English and American law, 
finding that the primary policy justifications for the exception are the 
trustee’s duty to furnish information to beneficiaries and the trustee’s 
solicitation of legal advice as a representative of the beneficiaries as “real 
clients” rather than for personal purposes. Id. at 232. The court then 
noted two exceptions to the fiduciary exception, to “allow the attorney-
client privilege to remain intact for an ERISA fiduciary when its interests 
diverge sufficiently from those of the beneficiaries . . . .” Id. at 233. The 
3rd Circuit viewed four factors: corporate ownership of assets, structural 
conflict of interest from the profit motive, handling of multitudes of 
ERISA and non-ERISA plans with divergent interests, and payment of 
legal fees from funds of the corporation, to find that the insurance 
company was the real client. Id. at 234–36. Finally, the court surmised 
that Congress never intended for ERISA trustees to be subject to the 
same obligations that apply to common law trustees, so that the duty to 
disclose was limited to certain circumstances, such as the denial of 
medical services. Id. at 236–37. 
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CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit found that the district court erred in 
ordering privileged documents discoverable under the fiduciary 
exception. Id. at 238. 
 
Biskupski v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: What is the proper interpretation of “‘actions taken’ in 
section 321(c) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).” Id. at 279. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2), 
which provides that any person who knowingly or recklessly helps an 
alien who did not receive official authorization to enter the United States, 
shall be subject to a fine or imprisonment or both. Id. at 278. In 1996, 
Congress expanded IIRIRA to make “immigrant smuggling” under 
section 1324(a)(2) an “aggravated felony” and extended the required 
imprisonment term to at least five years. Id. Upon changing the 
requirement, Congress noted that “[t]he amendments made by this 
section shall apply to actions taken on or after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, regardless of when the conviction occurred.” Id. The court 
looked to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Valderrama-Fonseca v. INS and 
the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Garrido-Morato v. Gonzales, both of which 
held that “actions taken” includes “actions and decisions of the Attorney 
General acting through an immigration judge or the BIA [Board of 
Immigration]” taken against the defendant “under the statute.” Id. at 282. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “actions taken” under IIRIRA 
section 321(c) means “orders or decisions of the IJ or BIA which apply 
the ‘aggravated felony’ definitions and thus determine the availability of 
discretionary hardship relief to such felons.” Id. at 283. The court found 
that “[t]his definition of ‘actions taken’ makes sense considering that 
until a final agency order is issued by either an IJ or the BIA, an alien 
remains the subject of administrative adjudication ‘and has . . . not 
established any right to the benefit he is seeking to obtain by his 
application.’” Id. 
 
Kolkevich v. Att’y Gen., 501 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether a criminal alien had the right to challenge the 
“final order of removal entered against [the alien] by the Attorney 
General, notwithstanding the fact that the passage of the REAL ID Act of 
2005 cuts off [the alien’s] right to file a petition for habeas corpus relief.” 
Id. at 324. 
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ANALYSIS: The court’s analysis began with the Suspension Clause 
[art I., § 9, cl. 2] of the U.S. Constitution which provides that “the 
privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended.” Id. at 
332. The court noted, however, that “the Suspension Clause does not 
require Congress to guarantee aliens the right to petition for habeas . . . at 
all times and under all circumstances.” Id. The court then referred to the 
Congressional History of the REAL ID Act of 2005 (RIDA) and stated 
that “Congress [did not intend] to risk running afoul of the Suspension 
Clause by suspending the writ of habeas corpus with respect to the small 
class of aliens who received final orders of removal more than thirty days 
prior to the enactment of RIDA.” Id. at 335. 
CONCLUSION: The court allowed a criminal alien thirty days after a 
RIDA enactment to challenge the final order of removal, which it 
believed was reasonable in light of the Congressional purpose in 
ensuring that criminal aliens received “the same type and amount of 
judicial review as other aliens.” Id. at 337. 
 
FOURTH CIRCUIT 
Etape v. Certoff, 497 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b), a 
naturalization applicant’s timely filing of a petition for a hearing in a 
federal court, due to the failure of the United States Bureau of 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) to make a decision on the 
naturalization application within 120 days, vested the court with 
exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 381. 
ANALYSIS: The court first looked to the 9th Circuit, which held, 
“section 1447(b) does indeed vest exclusive jurisdiction in the district 
court, and so prevents the CIS from further action . . . after a petition has 
been filed.” Id. at 382. The court then examined the statutory language 
and reasoned that because section 1447(b) “clearly prescribes 
consequences for the CIS’s failure to act,” and “a district court acquires 
jurisdiction and may either decide the matter itself or remand to the CIS 
with instructions,” therefore Congress intended to “provide district courts 
with exclusive jurisdiction.” Id. at 385. In addition, the court stated, 
“holding that section 1447(b) vests the district court with exclusive 
jurisdiction furthers the twin congressional goals of streamlining the 
process but retaining applicants’ judicial rights.” Id. at 386. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that a district court has exclusive 
jurisdiction over petitions filed under section 1447(b), and the “holding 
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should apply retroactively only to section 1447(b) cases still open on 
direct review.” Id. at 388. 
 
Discover Bank v. Vaden, 489 F.3d 594 (4th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether Congress intended the [Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, “FDIA”] to completely preempt state-law usury 
claims against state-chartered banks.” Id. at 604. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “National Bank Act (“NBA”) . . . 
is to national banks as . . . FDIA is to state-chartered banks.” Id. at 605. 
The court also noted that “the NBA completely preempts state-court 
usury claims against national banks.” Id. Therefore, the court concluded, 
there is “no such thing as a state-law claim of usury against a national 
bank.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: Following sister-circuit precedent and the Supreme 
Court’s findings, the 4th Circuit held that “Congress intended complete 
preemption of state-court usury claims under the FDIA.” Id. at 606. 
 
Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the Virginia Viatical Settlements Act, Va. 
Code Ann. § 38.2-6002, et seq., which regulates viatical settlements with 
insureds who are residents of Virginia, is saved from the dormant 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution by the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1012, as a state law that ‘relates to’ the 
regulation of the business of insurance or as a state law enacted ‘for the 
purpose of regulating the business of insurance.’” Id. at 286. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained that “the ‘relate to’ language in . . . 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act . . . is ‘clearly expansive’ and that a state 
law that has a ‘connection with’ or ‘reference to’ the regulation of the 
business of insurance is saved from the Commerce Clause’s 
preemption.” Id. at 297. The court stated that by “focusing on the 
business of insurance insofar as it involves the marketing, sale, 
execution, performance, and administration of insurance contracts, 
Congress gave States broad authority to regulate,” and the court reasoned 
that “because the Virginia Viatical Settlements Act addresses these 
aspects of insurance contracts with Virginia residents, the Act ‘relates to’ 
the regulation of the business of insurance.” Id. Additionally the court 
recognized that “[t]he broad category of laws enacted ‘for the purpose of 
regulating the business of insurance’ consists of laws that possess the 
end, intention, or aim of adjusting, managing, or controlling the business 
of insurance.” Id. The court explained that “[j]ust as the Virginia statute 
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relates to the business of insurance, it also clearly ‘manages’ and 
‘controls’ the relationship between the insurer and the insured and is 
‘aimed at protecting or regulating’ that relationship, as it dictates in what 
manner an insured may alter fundamental aspects of her relationship with 
the insurer.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “the Virginia Viatical 
Settlements Act relates to the regulation of the business of insurance; 
was enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance; and 
indeed regulates directly and substantially the actual business of 
insurance,” and “[t]hus the McCarran-Ferguson Act saves the Act from 
any dormant Commerce Clause challenge.” Id. at 299. 
 
Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provided an applicant with 
a remedy for alleged violations of the reasonable promptness of medical 
services provision under section 1396a(a)(8) of the Medicaid Act. Id. at 
355. 
ANALYSIS: The 4th Circuit first explained that while section 1983 
“imposes liability on any person who, under the color of state law, 
deprives another person of ‘any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws,’” some statutes bar private enforcement by 
section 1983. Id. The court proceeded to analyze the reasonable 
promptness provision of the Medicaid Act under the framework 
established by the Supreme Court in Blessing v. Freestone in order to 
determine “whether [the] statutory provision gives rise to an individual 
right” under section 1983. Id. at 355–56. First, the court found that the 
provision was designed to benefit all individuals eligible for Medicaid. 
Id. at 356. Second, the court determined that the provision was “not so 
‘vague and amorphous’ that the judiciary [could not] competently 
enforce it.” Id. On the contrary, the court explained that the Medicaid 
notification standard of “reasonable promptness” was clearly stated and 
defined by the relevant regulations and guidelines. Id. Third, the court 
pointed out that the provision clearly created an obligation that “plans 
‘must’ provide for assistance that ‘shall’ be delivered with reasonable 
promptness.” Id. Finally, the court noted that Congress neither explicitly 
nor impliedly foreclosed private enforcement under section 1983. Id. 
CONCLUSION: Noting that other circuit courts had reached the 
same conclusion, the 4th Circuit held that an applicant “may proceed 
under section 1983 to address any failure by [a state agency] to comply 
with the reasonable promptness provision of the Medicaid Act.” Id. at 
357. 
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FIFTH CIRCUIT 
Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether “courts should hold standing exists when the 
parties repeatedly admit by implication the facts necessary to satisfy 
standing.” Id. at 507. 
ANALYSIS: The court found an implied-admission concept 
regarding standing to be “sufficiently analogous to the approach taken by 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b).” Id. at 506. The court then stated 
the rule in part: “When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by 
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all 
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.” Id.  
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit concluded that the unchallenged 
allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint constituted a “noneconomic, 
intangible injury under our Establishment Clause jurisprudence.” Id. 
United States v. Ridgeway, 489 F.3d 732 (5th Cir. 2007)  
QUESTION: Whether the government, under the Victim and 
Witness Protection Act (“VWPA”), was authorized to file a lien against a 
debtor’s property for a restitution order owed to a private company on 
the private company’s behalf. Id at 734. 
ANALYSIS: The court determined that the provisions in VWPA are 
directed at payments due while the instant case involved outstanding 
debts. Therefore, the outcome was “governed by the enforcement 
provisions found in 18 U.S.C. § 3663(h).” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court ultimately adopted the government’s 
position, which interpreted section 3663 (h)(1)(A) as allowing the 
government “to utilize all methods of collection provided for in Title 18, 
Chapter 229, subchapter 12, one of . . . [which] creates a lien on the fined 
person’s property . . . [that does not] expire for twenty years . . . [as long 
as] the underlying judgment is less than twenty-two years old.” Id. at 
736. 
 
United States v. Brazell, 489 F.3d 666 (5th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether violation of 18 U.S.C. § 228(a)(3) constituted 
a continuing offense such that a defendant could continue to commit it 
after being sentenced to probation for a drug offense. Id. at 668. 
76 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 4:59 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that other circuits have concluded that 
failure to pay child support is a continuing offense. Id. The court agreed 
with its sister circuits’ interpretation and further qualified its reasoning 
with the Supreme Court’s definition of a “continuing offense” as “a 
continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse 
and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may 
occupy.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that while a defendant’s continual 
willful failure to satisfy a child support debt constituted a continuing 
offense, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant in 
this case violated section 228 while under a criminal sentence. Id. 
 
Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem’l Med. Ctr., 485 F.3d 793 (5th 
Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the pre-Hurricane Katrina addresses of 
hospitalized patients satisfied the local controversy exception of the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), 
which required a district court to “decline to exercise jurisdiction” in a 
class action lawsuit if, among other things, “greater than two-thirds of 
the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens 
of the State in which the action was originally filed.” Id. at 797. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained that “[a] party’s residence in a state 
alone does not establish domicile,” because domicile requires not only 
residence in the state but also “an intent to remain in the state.” Id. at 
798. Therefore, the court found that “the medical records are not 
tantamount to sufficient proof of citizenship.” Id. The court reasoned that 
“[d]espite the logistical challenges of offering reliable evidence at this 
preliminary jurisdictional stage, CAFA does not permit the courts to 
make a citizenship determination based on a record bare of any evidence 
showing class members’ intent to be domiciled in Louisiana.” Id. at 802. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “pre-Katrina addresses in 
the medical records fail to satisfy [the] burden” for meeting the two-
thirds citizenship requirement of the local controversy exception of 
CAFA. Id. 
 
Garrido-Morato v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the definition of the phrase “actions taken” in 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (“IIRIRA”) in sections 321(b) and (c) included “decisions of the 
Attorney General’s representatives with regard to a particular alien” for 
2007] First Impressions 77 
purposes of retroactively applying the new definition of aggravated 
felony found in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N). Id. at 324. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that, while the term may be more 
inclusive, it at least includes “actions and decisions of the Attorney 
General acting through an immigration judge or the BIA.” Id. The 5th 
Circuit noted, “[f]ive of six other circuit courts to consider this meaning 
in a variety of contexts agree with the government that ‘actions taken’ 
are decisions of the Attorney General’s representatives with regard to a 
particular alien.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the immigration judge’s ruling 
denying Plaintiff her hardship relief was an ‘action taken’ that caused the 
expressly retroactive definition of aggravated felony to apply.” Id. 
 
United States v. Gonzalez, 483 F.3d 390 (5th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether delegation of voir dire duties to a magistrate 
judge required personal, affirmative consent from the accused to be 
valid. Id. at 392. 
ANALYSIS: The court reviewed Supreme Court precedent to find 
that delegation of jury selection responsibilities over a defendant’s 
objection is not permitted and that voir dire, absent objection, is one of 
the duties that may be delegated. Id. The 5th Circuit then noted that the 
ambiguity as to what level of consent is required has resulted in a split in 
authority, with the 11th Circuit the only court to hold that the defendant’s 
personal consent is mandatory. Id. at 393. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that “the right to have an Article III 
judge conduct voir dire is one that may be waived though the consent of 
counsel.” Id. at 394. 
 
Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. De La Luz Garcia, 501 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 
2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the MCS-90B endorsement (the 
“Endorsement for Motor Carrier Policies of Insurance for Public 
Liability under Section 18 of the Regulatory Reform Act of 1982”) 
obligated an insurance company “to cover an accident occurring in 
Mexico.” Id. at 438–39. 
ANALYSIS: The court conducted a plain language reading of section 
31138 of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 and concluded that 
“although section 31138 recognizes that a commercial motor vehicle 
may be transporting passengers to ‘a place outside the United States,’ it 
requires minimum levels of financial responsibility only for the part of 
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the transportation that occurs ‘in the United States.’” Id. at 441. “[T]he 
minimum levels of financial responsibility requirements apply to the 
transportation of passengers ‘in the United States’; thus, the endorsement 
does not require an insurer to pay judgments recovered against the 
insured if the transportation of passengers by motor vehicle does not 
occur in the United States.” Id. In the instant case, the court indicated 
that because “the motor vehicle was not subject to the minimum financial 
responsibility requirements in section 31138” while in Mexico, therefore 
“the endorsement does not cover the . . . accident.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that “the MCS-90B endorsement is 
not applicable and does not provide coverage for the . . . accident” which 
occurred in Mexico. Id. at 442. 
 
Mahogany v. Stalder, No. 06-30699, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22284 
(5th Cir. Sept. 18, 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether a prisoner in state custody bringing a 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 “claim for damages arising from his failure to receive a 
written statement of the evidence relied on” in a prison disciplinary 
hearing “would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the judgment in 
the disciplinary proceeding.” Id. at 4. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the Supreme Court has held “a 
prisoner cannot maintain a section 1983 action for monetary damages if 
‘establishing the basis for the damages claim necessarily demonstrates 
the invalidity of the conviction’” Id. at 3. The court stated that “[t]he 
Supreme Court has recognized an inmate’s right to seek damages under 
section 1983 for the denial of procedural due process rights during prison 
disciplinary hearings, including the right to receive a written statement of 
the evidence relied on during those proceedings.” Id. at 4. The court 
concluded that a judgment in favor of the plaintiff “would not necessarily 
imply the invalidity of the finding of guilt or sanction imposed.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that “a claim for damages 
based on a failure to receive a written statement of the evidence relied on 
in a prison disciplinary proceeding is cognizable under section 1983 . . . 
the district court should not have dismissed Mohagany’s section 1983 
claim in so far as Mahogany [sought] damages for the violation of his 
due process rights.” Id. at 5. 
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United States v. Araguz-Briones, No. 06-40937, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
17481 (5th Cir. July 23, 2007) 
QUESTION: “Whether a court should hold the government to its 
obligations under a plea agreement after the court invalidates a 
defendant’s obligation not to appeal his sentence.” Id. at 3. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit looked to the 2nd Circuit’s ruling in 
United States v. Stevens for guidance in ruling on the government’s 
available remedies where the defendant signed a plea agreement but 
breached it by filing an appeal. Id. at 9. The defendant agreed to sign an 
appeal waiver in return for the government’s promise to move for a one-
level downward departure in the sentencing guidelines. Id.  
CONCLUSION: The court found that the government would be 
entitled to have a court either “(1) resentence [the defendant], with the 
government’s moving for the one-level section 5K3.1 reduction as called 
for in the plea agreement, or (2) vacate the plea agreement in its entirety 
and allow the parties either to reach a new agreement or to go to trial.” 
Id. at 10. The court also explained that the defendant “may not, however 
(unless the government consents), retain the benefits of the sentencing 
agreement while being relieved of its burdens.” Id. 
 
United States v. Planck, 493 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether separate charges against a defendant for 
possession of individual devices that contained images and/or movies of 
child pornography violated the rule against multiplicitous prosecutions. 
Id. at 503. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit looked to “precedent in analogous 
cases” to guide its analysis of the statute. Id. The court first examined 18 
U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), which proscribes “knowingly possess[ing] any 
book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or any other 
material that contains an image of child pornography . . . .” Id. The 11th 
Circuit, “[i]n deciding whether an indictment is multiplicitous, looked to 
whether separate and distinct prohibited acts, made punishable by law, 
have been committed.” Id. at 503. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that the actus reus of the crime at 
hand was the possession of child pornography, and that the government, 
for a single crime, only needed to prove that the defendant possessed the 
contraband at a single place and time to establish a single act of 
possession. Id. at 505. Thus, because the defendant possessed the child 
pornography through different transactions and in three separate places, 
he had committed three separate crimes; therefore the counts were not 
multiplicitous. Id. 
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SIXTH CIRCUIT 
Revis v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273 (6th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the judgment for summary eviction and 
physical seizure of a residence pursuant to a writ of execution without 
advance notice to a judgment debtor in a sexual-harassment lawsuit, 
provided constitutionally-adequate process. Id. at 281. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit noted that the underlying sexual-
harassment lawsuit established only the debtor’s financial obligation. Id. 
Thus the court noted that “this materially distinguishes the judgment 
against [the debtor] from a judgment for possession upon which a writ of 
possession may issue.” Id. Additionally, the court further remarked that 
several authorities “support the principle that an execution levied upon 
real estate does not result in the immediate eviction of the judgment 
debtor.” Id. at 283. Furthermore, the 6th Circuit indicated that “while 
personal property may be levied upon through seizure, a writ of 
execution for real property is generally levied by formally noting on the 
writ a legal description of the property and giving notice to the owner 
and the public that the property is subject to sale.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that the underlying litigation 
and judgment for summary eviction of judgment debtor and physical 
seizure of his residence, pursuant to a writ of execution without advance 
notice, did not provide constitutionally adequate process. Id. at 281. 
 
Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the “Treasury Department’s ‘check-the-box’ 
regulations, 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-1 to 301.7701-3, promulgated in 1996 
to simplify the classification of business entities for tax purposes,” were 
valid. Id. at 374. 
ANALYSIS: The court agreed with the district court that the “check-
the-box” regulations were ambiguous “when applied to recently 
emerging hybrid business entities such as the LLCs involved in this 
case” and that the Treasury regulations “developed to fill in the statutory 
gaps when dealing with such entities are eminently reasonable.” Id. at 
378. Additionally, the court ruled that the ‘check-the-box’ regulations 
were “a valid exercise of the agency’s authority . . . [and] that the 
plaintiff’s failure to make an election under the ‘check-the-box’ 
provision dictate[d] that his companies be treated as disregarded entities 
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under those regulations, thereby preventing them from being taxed as 
corporations under the Internal Revenue Code.” Id. Accordingly, the 
court held that Littriello was liable for the taxes due from those 
businesses, because they constitute sole proprietorships under section 
7701, and he was the proprietor. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that the “check-the-box” 
Treasury regulations were reasonable and a valid exercise of the IRS’s 
authority to fill statutory gaps as to emerging hybrid business entities 
under the statute defining business entities for tax treatment. Id. 
 
City of Cookeville v. Upper Cumberland Elec. Mbrshp. Corp., 484 F.3d 
380 (6th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether a defense asserting that federal law preempted 
plaintiff’s proposed condemnation of defendant’s facilities “because the 
condemnation frustrated the purposes of the Rural Electrification Act of 
1936 (“REAct”), 7 U.S.C. §§ 901–950bb (as amended),” was considered 
a colorable defense for purposes of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442. Id. 
at 391. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by noting that a colorable defense 
“need only be plausible; its ultimately validity is not to be determined at 
the time of the removal.” Id. The court examined the defense and found 
that it “had previously found success in other circuits,” and that, as a 
result of this success, “one would be hard pressed to say that the defense 
was not colorable.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that removal of the action “to the 
district court[,] even if assertion of a colorable defense were required,” 
was proper. Id. at 392. 
 
United States v. Malone, 503 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether it was permissible “for a district court to 
consider as part of its sentencing calculus the sentence that a defendant 
likely would have received had he been prosecuted in state court.” Id. at 
485. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit first observed the “3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 
and 10th circuits have uniformly found it improper for a district court to 
consider state court sentences for comparable crimes when fashioning a 
federal defendant’s sentence.” Id. The court then recognized that 
“considering state court sentences, a district court actually is re-injecting 
the locality disparity that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”) 
was designed to guard against.” Id. at 486. The court reasoned that to 
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allow such consideration “[n]ot only would . . . enhance, rather than 
diminish, disparities, it also would permit district courts to impose 
upward variances based on state sentencing practices.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “it is impermissible for a district 
court to consider the defendant’s likely state court sentence as a factor in 
determining his federal sentence.” Id. 
 
Loren v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 505 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether “multiple [health care] coverage options 
[offered by an employer]” constituted “one plan pursuant to the 
Employee Retirement Income and Security Act (“ERISA”). Id. at 604. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit first noted that the proposed regulations 
for the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act established a 
presumption that health benefits offered by an employer were part of a 
single ERISA health plan, and that the filing of a single plan document 
was strong evidence that the employer created just one plan. Id. at 605. 
The court of appeals explained that this presumption could be overcome, 
however, with a showing that an employer filed multiple plan documents 
with the intent to create separate plans. Id. The court relied on the 10th 
Circuit’s analysis of the issue, considering each of the factors enunciated 
by the 10th Circuit. Id. First, the court noted that defendants had each 
filed only one plan document with a single ERISA identification number. 
Id. at 606. Second, the court pointed out that the defendants could not 
demonstrate that they had intended to “establish multiple plans.” Id. 
Although the court did not explain whether the “plans shared the same 
administrator or trust” (another consideration articulated by the 10th 
Circuit), the 6th Circuit found that the other factors were sufficient to 
make a determination. Id. 
CONCLUSION: After considering the factors articulated by the 10th 
Circuit, the 6th Circuit held that the defendants had “not overcome the 
presumption that the employee health benefits offered by an employer, 
[provided for and operated under a single plan document,] constitute[d] a 
single ERISA plan.” Id. 
 
United States v. Carter, 500 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “Whether a [18 U.S.C.] § 3582 motion should be 
considered as a second or successive [18 U.S.C.] § 2255 motion.” Id. at 
489. 
ANALYSIS: The court determined that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) 
provides “a mechanism for the modification of a sentence” if the 
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Sentencing Commission changed the “relevant sentencing range after a 
defendant is sentenced.” Id. at 488. The court applied the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Gonzalez v. Crosby, which held that “a Rule 60(b) 
motion should be construed as a successive habeas petition when it 
attacks the substance of the defendant’s motion,” to a section 3582 
motion, finding that both rules “could be used . . . to circumvent the 
screening requirements of section 2255 and attack the merits of 
[petitioners’] convictions and sentences.” Id. at 488–89. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that “when a motion titled as a 
section 3582 motion otherwise attacks the petitioner’s underlying 
conviction or sentence, that is an attack on the merits of the case and 
should be construed as a section 2255 motion.” Id. at 489. 
 
Mossaad v. Gonzales, No. 06-3313, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 19094 (6th 
Cir. Aug. 8, 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the “aggravated felony bar provisions of the 
Immigration Act of 1990 and MTINA [Miscellaneous and Technical 
Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991]” applied 
retroactively to the defendant’s 1989 conviction for armed robbery. Id. at 
5. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit utilized a two-pronged approach 
provided by the Supreme Court “for determining [whether] a statute 
should be applied retroactively.” Id. Under the first prong, “a court must 
ascertain whether Congress has ‘directed with the requisite clarity that 
the law be applied retrospectively.’” Id. The Sixth Circuit further noted 
that, “[i]f the court finds that Congress clearly intended for the law to be 
applied retroactively, the analysis ends and the law may be applied as 
Congress clearly intended.” Id. Under the second prong, “[i]f . . . the 
court finds that Congress was not clear enough in its intention to apply 
the law retroactively, it must determine whether the law attaches new 
legal consequences.” Id. The Sixth Circuit considered the present issue 
only under the first prong. Id. at 6. The court opined, “Congress more 
than adequately dictated that the aggravated felony bars contained in the 
Immigration Act of 1990 and MTINA should apply retroactively to all 
such convictions.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “Given the clarity with which Congress has spoken 
with regard to the retroactive effect of the aggravated felony bar,” the 
court denied the defendant’s petition for review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeal’s determination that his “conviction for armed 
robbery bar[red] his claims for asylum and withholding of removal” Id. 
at 10. 
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Bridges v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 498 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether an ERISA [Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act] plan beneficiary lacked statutory standing and became 
incapable of representing a class based upon divestiture from the ERISA 
plan. Id. at 444. 
ANALYSIS: The court first distinguished statutory standing from 
standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 444–45. The 
court then looked to the plain language of the ERISA statute and 
Supreme Court precedent to find that the statutory definition of 
“participant” includes employees or former employees with a colorable 
claim against the ERISA Plan. Id. at 445. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit joined the 7th Circuit in holding that 
divestiture from an ERISA plan did not eliminate statutory standing, and 
remanded the case for consideration of the issue of whether a divested 
plan participant qualified as a class representative. Id. 
 
United States v. Amos, 501 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether a defendant’s “prior conviction for possession 
of a sawed-off shotgun” could serve “as a predicate ‘violent felony’ for 
purposes of a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal 
Act.” Id. at 525. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by noting that possession of a sawed-
off shotgun was not a specifically named offense and did not involve the 
use of explosives and, as a result, “it would only qualify as a predicate 
offense if it is deemed to be ‘conduct that presents a serious potential risk 
of physical injury to another.’” Id. at 526. The court opined that mere 
possession of a sawed-off shotgun was not in line with the more active 
crimes included in the statute. Id. The court also found that, “[a]lthough 
many instances of sawed-off shotgun possession create a greater risk of 
harm to others, . . . the same cannot be said for all instances of 
possession, such as where it is stored unloaded in an attic or the trunk of 
a car.” Id. at 528–29. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “a prior conviction for 
possession of a sawed-off shotgun does not amount to a violent felony 
under section 924(e).” Id. at 530. 
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SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
United States v. Burt, 495 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether excerpts from a chat log, “which the 
government had altered to replace the screen names with real names,” 
qualified as hearsay, making its admission an abuse of discretion. Id. at 
739. 
ANALYSIS: The court remarked that “[i]t is today increasingly 
common to encounter the use of demonstrative aids throughout a trial. . . 
. Demonstrative aids take many forms; [including] duplicates, models, 
maps, sketches and diagrams, and computer-generated pedagogic aids.” 
Id. at 740. The court explained that “[j]ust as a sketch or model of a 
crime scene can be used to help a witness to recount aspects of testimony 
and to make that testimony more accessible and understandable for the 
jury, so might affixing the names of real people in place of their aliases 
put the computer chat comments into a more useful context for the 
witnesses and the jury.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit found “no reason not to extend the 
logic of allowing models, maps, sketches, and diagrams to incorporate 
these particular chat excerpts as well.” Id. 
 
United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “Whether a conviction may be appealed following 
imposition of a provisional sentence under [18 U.S.C.] § 4244.” Id. at 
614. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that the general rule established in U.S. 
v. Nixon, which restricts the filing of an appeal until the imposition of a 
final sentence, “[was] not intended to deny review to defendants who 
have not received a ‘final’ sentence but nonetheless are subjected to 
judicial control for a criminal conviction.” Id. The court explained that 
“[w]ere [a defendant] denied appeal until [the imposition] of a final 
sentence, he might remain under commitment for the entire duration of 
the provisional sentence, with no opportunity to appeal his conviction.” 
Id. at 615. Furthermore, the court found that the “imposition of discipline 
subjecting the defendant to the orders of the court makes a conviction 
final for the purposes of appeal.” Id. 
86 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 4:59 
CONCLUSION: The court agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. Abou-Kassem and held that “a provisional sentence 
imposed pursuant to section 4244 is sufficiently final for appeal.” Id. 
 
Moreno-Cebrero v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 395 (7th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether detention prior to conviction should count 
toward the term of imprisonment used to bar an alien from receiving 
relief under [former INA] section 212(c).” Id. at 398. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that “[i]n calculating the term of 
imprisonment for section 212(c) waivers, courts of appeals have looked 
to the time of actual incarceration, rather than the nominal sentence 
ordered by a court.” Id. at 398–99. The court ruled that the “pretrial 
detention had been related to [the defendant’s] crime of conviction” 
because “[s]ection 3585(a) [which] governs the commencement of a 
‘sentence to a term of imprisonment’” states that “[t]ime spent in 
‘official detention prior to the date the sentence commences’ is, 
according to the statute, part of that service.” Id. at 399. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “[t]he only sensible result 
is to count that period as time that [the defendant] ‘served for such 
felony’ for purposes of section 212(c).” Id. at 400. 
 
United States v. Simmons, 485 F.3d 951 (7th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether “[U.S.S.G] § 2K2.1(a)(5) expired when [18 
U.S.C.] § 921(a)(30) expired” and therefore precluded the use of section 
2K2.1(a)(5) “to calculate [the defendant’s] sentence.” Id. at 953. Also, 
whether “under section 2K2.1(a)(5), . . . a Ruger Mini-14 firearm falls 
within the exception to section 921(a)(30) for weapons manufactured 
prior to September 13, 1994.” Id. at 954. 
ANALYSIS: The court agreed with the 2nd and 10th Circuits to rule 
that “the Sentencing Commission intended that courts determine for 
purposes of section 2K2.1(a)(5) whether the firearm used by the 
defendant qualified as a ‘semiautomatic assault weapon’ under section 
921(a)(30) at the time of the crime.” Id. Additionally, the court agreed 
with a majority of the circuit courts and “held that the exception to 18 
U.S.C. § 921(a)(30) for weapons manufactured prior to September 13, 
1994, applies to defendants charged with simple possession and not to 
sentence enhancements under the guidelines.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “the district court properly used 
2K2.1(a)(5) to calculate [the defendant’s] sentence” and “that the district 
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court properly enhanced [the defendant’s] sentence for selling the Ruger 
Mini-14.” Id. 
 
Harzewski v. Guidant Corp., 489 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether a former employee had a right “to obtain 
monetary relief under ERISA [Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act] for a breach of fiduciary duty by the fiduciary of a defined-
contribution plan.” Id. at 806. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis with an overview of cases 
which held “benefits that a former employee may seek are not limited to 
defined benefits.” Id. The court noted that benefits in a defined-
contribution plan were “the value of the retirement account when the 
employee retires, and a breach of fiduciary duty that diminishes that 
value gives rise to a claim for benefits.” Id. at 807. Furthermore, the 
court recognized that “there is nothing in ERISA to suggest that a benefit 
must be a liquidated amount in order to be recoverable.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: Although the 7th Circuit held that former employees 
are entitled to monetary relief under an ERISA plan, the court remanded 
the case because the actual amount was undeterminable based on the 
relevant facts presented. Id. 
 
United States v. Veazey, 491 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether a sentencing guidelines cross-reference 
“relating to creating visual depictions of criminal sexual conduct with 
minors” applied “when the defendant’s purpose to create a visual 
depiction was a secondary, rather than primary, purpose of the offense 
conduct.” Id. at 705–706. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by noting that “[n]owhere does the 
guideline require that producing a visual depiction be the only purpose of 
the defendant in committing the offense.” Id. at 707. After reviewing the 
guideline and its accompanying notes, the court agreed with the 9th 
Circuit, finding that the cross-reference that enhanced sentences under 
section 2G1.3(c)(1) of the sentencing guidelines should “apply broadly 
and include ‘all instances’ where the defendant had a purpose to create a 
visual depiction.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “the cross-reference applies 
when one of the defendant’s purposes was to create a visual depiction of 
sexually explicit conduct, without regard to whether that purpose was the 
primary motivation for the defendant’s conduct.” Id. 
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Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 
571 (7th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “Whether, in interpreting an arbitration agreement that 
falls within the New York Convention [“the Convention”], but that 
contains no choice-of-law-provision,” the court should apply a federal 
common law rule of decision or determine the appropriate governing 
state law via choice-of-law principles. Id. at 575. 
ANALYSIS: The 7th Circuit stated that the Convention and its 
implementing federal legislation expressed “a clear federal interest in 
uniform rules by which agreements to arbitrate will be enforced.” Id. at 
579. Such a view was consistent with rulings by other federal courts of 
appeals. Id. The court indicated that in the absence of a choice-of-law 
provision, parties were bound, with no state-specific exceptions, to abide 
by the language of arbitration clauses. Id. at 581. Additionally, the court 
found that the conditions set forth in Boyle v. United Technologies, 
discussing when it was necessary to resort to federal rules, had all been 
met. Id. at 580. 
CONCLUSION: Federal concern with regard to uniformity in the 
treatment of international arbitration agreements required that the court 
apply a federal common law rule as opposed to state law. Id. at 579.  
 
FreeEats.com, Inc. v. Indiana, 502 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether a fast-approaching election justified “refusing 
to abstain under the principles of Younger [v. Harris].” Id. at 598. 
ANALYSIS: The court found guidance in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Pennzoil v. Texaco, Inc., “in which the Court reiterated that ‘a 
federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate 
remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.’” Id. 
The court noted that “[a] party that exercises a state court’s ordinary 
procedural processes to delay an action cannot then turn around and 
claim that because of that delay there is no state remedy available to 
meaningfully, timely, and adequately address its constitutional claim.” 
Id. at 599. The court further recognized that “[i]f we were to conclude 
that waiting until weeks before an election to file a suit seeking 
injunctive and declaratory relief from a state statute that was enacted 
eighteen years earlier gives rise to ‘extraordinary circumstances,’ then it 
would give license to the federal courts to run roughshod over the state 
courts’ rights to adjudicate properly filed actions involving constitutional 
challenges that relate in some way to that election. That result would not 
respect comity, and thus it would violate the core principles of Younger.” 
Id. at 600. 
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CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that the district court “erred in 
declining to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over this case pursuant 
to the Younger abstention doctrine.” Id. 
 
Auto. Mechs. Local 701 Welfare & Pension Funds v. Vanguard Car 
Rental USA, Inc., 502 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether, as part of its collective bargaining agreement 
(“CBA”) with the union, the employer had to pay the increased contrition 
rate “during the status quo, post-contractual period.” Id. at 748. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[f]ederal courts of appeals have 
the authority to provide relief when doing so would ‘be just under the 
circumstances.’ This includes the prerogative to decide motions for 
summary judgment as a matter of first impression . . . .” Id. at 747. 
Nonetheless, the court explained that ‘[i]n most instances . . . such a 
decision is best made by the district court; we would rarely find it 
appropriate to direct the entry of summary judgment’ . . . ‘rarely’ does 
not mean ‘never,’ though.” Id. Therefore, the 7th Circuit interpreted the 
collective bargaining agreement to conclude that, “as drafted, the ‘status 
quo’ period is not part of a renewed term.’” Id. at 749. The court found 
that “until there is a new CBA, the contribution rates must remain at the 
status quo level, which is the say at the level stipulated in the expired 
CBA.” Id. at 750. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit granted summary judgment, holding 
that “since there was no renewed term, the Board of Trustees had no 
authority to set new contribution rates and Vanguard had no obligation to 
pay them.” Id. 
 
United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “Whether a state may be an ‘enterprise’ for purposes of 
a RICO [Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act] 
prosecution.” Id. at 694. 
ANALYSIS: The court first looked at United States v. Turkette, in 
which the Supreme Court stated that “[e]ven if one or more of the civil 
remedies might be inapplicable to a particular illegitimate enterprise, this 
fact would not serve to limit the enterprise concept.” Id. The 7th Circuit 
reasoned that since Turkette held that “other public bodies, which 
similarly cannot be dissolved, may be [an] ‘enterprise’” under RICO, so 
may a sovereign state. Id. Furthermore, the 7th Circuit agreed with its 
sister courts that public government entities could be “enterprises” under 
RICO, and endorsed the reasoning of United States v. Thompson: that it 
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“seem[ed] clear . . . that those who played the leading roles in the 
enactment of the RICO statute thoroughly understood organized crime’s 
impact upon government entities.” Id. at 695. The court explained that 
“the use of the state as the RICO enterprise in the indictment is 
analogous to the courts’ treatment of the state as a market participant in a 
dormant commerce clause case” because in such cases a state is “a victim 
of the overall scheme” perpetrated by certain individuals. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit concluded that “[t]he district court 
did not err by allowing the state to be the RICO enterprise in this RICO 
conspiracy prosecution.” Id. 
 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
United States v. Gonzalez, 495 F.3d 577 (8th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “What constitutes sufficient evidence to support a 
statute of limitations instruction in an escape case.” Id. at 579. 
ANALYSIS: The court related that “Congress has specifically 
indicated: ‘no statute of limitations shall extend to any person fleeing 
from justice.’” Id. at 580. The court further noted that entering the United 
States “without arrest does not indicate . . . [an attempt] to surrender or . . 
. any intent to return to federal custody.” Id. at 581. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that the defendant “presented 
no evidence he terminated his escape” and thus there was no trigger to a 
statute of limitations. Id. 
 
Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man Roland, Inc., 491 F.3d 355 (8th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether international comity should be afforded 
conservative or liberal deference for courts issuing an antisuit injunction. 
Id. at 359. 
ANALYSIS: The court first recognized a circuit split regarding the 
level of deference afforded to international comity when courts consider 
issuing an antisuit injunction. Id. The court noted that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 
6th, and D. C. Circuits have adopted the ‘conservative approach’ to issue 
antisuit injunctions sparingly in the rarest of cases, such as when “an 
action in a foreign jurisdiction would prevent United States jurisdiction 
or threaten a vital United States policy and [when] . . . domestic interests 
outweigh . . . international comity.” Id. In contrast, the court related that 
the “5th and 9th Circuits follow the ‘liberal approach’ . . . [that permits] 
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an antisuit injunction when necessary to prevent duplicative and 
vexatious foreign litigation and . . . inconsistent judgments.” Id. at 360. 
CONCLUSION: Because the court held that international comity is a 
fundamental principle whose “importance in our globalized economy 
cannot be overstated,” the court found that it deserved “conservative 
deference.” Id. Furthermore, the court adopted the “conservative 
approach” so as not to “convey the message . . . that [it] . . . has so little 
confidence in the foreign court’s ability to adjudicate a given dispute 
fairly and efficiently that is unwilling to even allow the possibility.” Id. 
 
United States v. Griffin, 482 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether “an expectation of receipt of child 
pornography through Kazaa file sharing” constituted “‘a thing of value, 
but not for pecuniary gain’ for sentence enhancement purposes under 
section 2G2.2(b)(2)(B)” of the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 1011. 
ANALYSIS: The 8th Circuit noted that “‘[d]istribution for the 
receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value but not for 
pecuniary gain’ means any transaction, including bartering or other in-
kind transaction, that is conducted for a thing of value, but not for 
profit.” Id. The court further found that “in a case involving the bartering 
of child pornography, the ‘thing of value’ is the child pornographic 
material received in exchange for other child pornographic material.” Id. 
Finally, the court noted that under previous versions of the guidelines, it 
had held “that the five-level distribution enhancement was warranted if 
the defendant engaged in trading or bartering of child pornography, or if 
the government demonstrated that the defendant expected to receive 
pornographic images in exchange for the images he distributed.” Id. at 
1012–13. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “section 2G2.2(b)(2)(B)’s five-
level enhancement for the distribution of child pornography ‘for the 
receipt, or the expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but not for 
pecuniary gain’ applied” to a defendant who downloaded and shared   
child pornography files “via an internet peer-topeer [sic] file-sharing 
network.” Id. at 1013. 
 
United States v. Stanko, 491 F.3d 408 (8th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether a prior conviction under the Federal Meat 
Inspection Act (“FMIA”) fell “within the ‘business practices’ exclusion 
of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(A).” Id. at 911. 
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ANALYSIS: The court disagreed with the defendant’s assertion that 
section 921(a)(20)(A) excludes “convictions for all business-related 
offenses from qualifying a defendant as a prohibited person under section 
922(g)(1),” concluding instead that “the plain meaning of the statute 
indicates Congress’s intent to limit the offenses that fall within the . . . 
exclusion to those pertinent to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, 
restraints of trade, or offenses similar to them.” Id. at 413–14. The court 
further concluded that “despite the fact that the FMIA statutory scheme 
necessarily involves regulating business and may have the effect of 
protecting consumers and competition from economic harm, . . . the 
primary purpose . . . is to protect public health from the effects of 
unwholesome meat.” Id. at 417. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that defendant’s “FMIA 
convictions do not fall within [the] section 921(a)(20)(A) exclusion.” Id. 
at 419. 
 
Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the reassignment language under the ADA 
[Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990] required employers to 
automatically reassign disabled employees to a vacant position “without 
first competing with other applicants” in direct contradiction to the 
employer’s non-discriminatory policy. Id. at 482. 
ANALYSIS: The court looked to other circuits for guidance on this 
question and adopted the view espoused by the 7th Circuit. Id. at 483. 
The 7th Circuit held that reassignment under the ADA “does not require 
an employer to reassign a qualified disabled employee to a job for which 
there is a more qualified applicant, if the employer has a policy to hire 
the most qualified applicant.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: Accordingly, the court ruled that the ADA “does not 
require an employer to reassign a qualified disabled employee to a vacant 
position when such a reassignment would violate a legitimate 




United States v. Valenzuela, 495 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: How a district court should apply section 2K2.1(b)(5) 
of the Sentencing Guidelines, requiring a sentence enhancement for any 
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defendant that “used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in 
connection with another felony offense; or possessed or transferred any 
firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent or reason to believe that it 
would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense.” 
Id. at 1131. 
ANALYSIS: The court first used language from the Supreme Court 
and its own jurisprudence to define the terms “use” and “possession” for 
the purposes of section 2K2.1(b)(5). Id. To determine if a defendant’s 
other offense constituted “another felony offense” under section 
2K2.1(b)(5), the court looked to other circuits that employed the test 
outlined in Blockburger v. United States, which stated if the firearms 
offense and the other felony offense “each contain a element different 
from the other . . . the [firearms] offense may be used as ‘another felony 
offense’ to enhance a defendant’s sentence.” Id. 1132. Second, the court 
reasoned that if the “other felony offense” contained, as an element, the 
possession or sale of a firearm, that “other felony offense was a firearms 
possession or trafficking offense, and cannot be used to enhance a 
sentence under section 2K2.1(b)(5).” Id. at 1134. Third, the court stated 
that a “district court must decide if the defendant used or possessed the 
firearm in connection with the other felony offense,” meaning the 
defendant either “actively employed” the firearm or it emboldened the 
“‘defendant’s felonious conduct.’” Id. Finally, the court found that “a 
district court may enhance a defendant’s sentence under section 
2K2.1(b)(5)” when all three elements are met. Id. 
CONCLUSION: When determining whether to apply a sentence 
enhancement under section 2K2.1(b)(5) of the sentencing guidelines, “a 
district court should both determine under the Blockburger test whether 
the other felony offense . . . is a separate offense from the predicate 
felony offense [, and d]ecide if the defendant actively employed or 
possessed the firearm in a manner that emboldened . . . the other felony 
offense.” Id. at 1136. 
 
Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. 
Flores-Ortega created a new rule of constitutional law regarding the 
obligation of counsel to consult with the client concerning an appeal. Id. 
at 1141. 
ANALYSIS: The court first declared that “courts should have 
recognized post-Strickland that a reasonably effective attorney would 
inform the client when he or she had a good reason to appeal.” Id. at 
1142. Next, the court asserted that ABA [American Bar Association] 
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standards had “put defense attorneys on notice that they should discuss 
any viable grounds for appeal with their clients.” Id. Finally, the court 
determined that the Flores-Ortega decision merely applied the standards 
set forth in Strickland, concluding that “[e]ach time that a court 
delineates what ‘reasonably effective assistance’ requires of defense 
attorneys with respect to a particular aspect of client representation, it 
can hardly be thought to have created a new principle of constitutional 
law.” Id. at 1144. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “Flores-Ortega broke no new 
ground in holding that reasonably effective performance requires a 
defense attorney to discuss an appeal with her client whenever there is a 
rational basis to think that her client should appeal” and that the decision 
in Flores-Ortega “did not produce ‘a result so novel’ [as to have] 
forge[d] a new rule. . . .” Id. at 1142. 
 
U.S. Mortg. Inc. v. Jenson, 494 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards 
Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”) “allows or prohibits amendment of the 
complaint in a removed action.” Id. at 842. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “Congress included no express 
prohibition against amendment” following removal, and that “no court 
has held that SLUSA completely and categorically bars any amendment 
of the complaint following removal.” Id. at 843. In addition, the court 
identified several district courts in the 9th Circuit which permitted 
plaintiffs to amend a removed complaint. Id. Further, the court found 
inequity in a policy which would require “dismiss[al] [of] otherwise 
valid and viable state law claims on the ground that plaintiff pled—
perhaps inadvertently—a cause of action that may be construed as 
federal in nature.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that “[i]n light of the statutory 
silence on the issue in SLUSA, the existence of competing policy 
rationales, and the fact that the granting or denial of leave to amend is 
ordinarily a matter left to the discretion of the district court . . . SLUSA 
does not prohibit amendment of the complaint after removal.” Id. 
 
Peru v. Sharpshooter Spectrum Venture LLC, 493 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 
2007) 
QUESTION: What is a “retail outlet” for the purposes of the 
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”). Id. at 
1063. 
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ANALYSIS: The court accepted the Benefit Review Board’s 
(“BRB”) “interpretation of the phrase ‘retail outlet’ to mean any place 
where items are sold directly to consumers” as reasonable. Id. at 1063–
64. Having defined “retail outlet,” the court then addressed “whether 
Peru was ‘employed by’ such an enterprise when she was injured.” Id. at 
1064. The court affirmed the BRB’s conclusion “that Peru falls within 
the ‘retail outlet’ exclusion at 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(B)” because a 
“substantial . . . part of . . . Peru’s employment activities revolved around 
operation of a retail outlet” and there was insufficient evidence to show 
that either the employer’s business or “Peru’s employment activities had 
any substantial connection to traditional maritime activities.  Id. at 1066. 
The court noted that section 902(3) expressly provided that individuals 
described in the retail exclusion were excluded from LHWCA coverage 
only if they were subject to coverage under a State workers’ 
compensation law. Id. at 1067. 
CONCLUSION: The court affirmed the BRB’s “holding that Peru 
falls within the retail exclusion,” but it remanded the case to the BRB “to 
determine in the first instance whether she [was] covered by Hawaii’s 
state workers’ compensation law.” Id. at 1066–67. 
 
Goel v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 735 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether “polygraph examination results qualify as 
evidence that was ‘not available’ within 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), [the 
statute for reopening or reconsideration before the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”)] and thus may support a successful motion to reopen.” 
Id. at 738. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that the key question was “whether the 
allegedly new information was unavailable at the time of the movant’s 
hearing.” Id. The court indicated that if the new information “was 
available or capable of being discovered at that time, it cannot provide a 
basis for reopening.” Id. The court noted, “[w]e do not necessarily 
preclude the discretionary consideration of polygraph evidence by an IJ 
[immigration judge] or the BIA at earlier stages of a removal 
proceeding.” Id. at 739. 
CONCLUSION: Agreeing with the BIA, the 9th Circuit held that 
“polygraph evidence provides no adequate basis for reopening because it 
is not evidence that was previously unavailable within the meaning of the 
applicable regulation.” Id. at 737. 
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Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County of San Diego, 490 F.3d 700 (9th 
Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) regarding the removal of 
state and local legislative barriers to telecommunications service was 
applicable “to preempt an entire wireless facilities zoning ordinance,” or 
whether “any challenge to a local zoning ordinance” could be lodged 
under section 332(c)(7).  Id. at 710, 712. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that section 253(a) “applies on its face 
to local ordinances that have the effect of prohibiting wireless service.” 
The court then looked at legislative history of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 and determined that it “does not indicate that Congress 
intended a result contrary to the plain reading of the statute.” Id. at 714. 
The court found there is “no indication . . . that Congress feared section 
253(a)’s preemption language would endanger local zoning ordinances it 
intended to permit under section 332(c)(7).” Id. at 715. 
CONCLUSION: Agreeing with the district court, the 9th Circuit held 
“that section 253(a) is a proper vehicle to challenge an entire wireless 
facilities zoning ordinance.” Id. at 709. 
 
United States v. Strong, 489 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “Whether mandatory commitment under [18 U.S.C.] § 
4241(d) violates a defendant’s fundamental liberty interest under the Due 
Process Clause.” Id. at 1060. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit adopted the Supreme Court’s test 
regarding the constitutionality of committing a criminal defendant. Id. at 
1061. The court highlighted “[t]he two factors articulated by the 
[Supreme] Court: (1) the duration of the defendant’s commitment, and 
(2) the closeness of the fit between the commitment and the purpose for 
which such commitment is designed.” Id. at 1061. The court held that the 
“duration of the commitment authorized under section 4241(d) is 
inherently limited,” and that “commitment under section 4241(d) bears a 
‘reasonable relation’ to the purpose for which it is designed: determining 
whether a criminal defendant is susceptible to timely restoration.” Id. at 
1061–62. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “section 4241(d) is 
consistent with defendants’ due process rights.” Id. at 1060. 
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United States v. Gomez-Mendez, 486 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a defendant’s prior California conviction 
for unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor qualifies as a ‘crime of 
violence’ under the federal Sentencing Guidelines.” Id. at 600. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that although the guidelines “fail 
to define a ‘crime of violence’ . . . [t]he Commission’s commentary . . . 
defines a ‘crime of violence’ to mean [among other crimes] . . . statutory 
rape.” Id. at 602. The court reasoned that because unlawful sexual 
intercourse with a minor is considered under “California’s statutory rape 
law[,] . . . the district court did not err in concluding that . . . [the crime] 
qualified categorically as a ‘crime of violence’.” Id. at 603. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that a “prior conviction for 
unlawful sexual intercourse [with a minor] . . . under Cal. Penal Code § 
261.5(d) qualifie[d] as a ‘crime of violence’ under” the federal 
Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 607. 
 
United States v. Hollis, No. 05-30611, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 10796 
(9th Cir. May 7, 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a conviction under [21 U.S.C. § 
841(b)(1)(A)(iii)] requires the government to charge, and the jury to find, 
more than that [the] defendant distributed cocaine base.” Id. at 1155. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[t]here can be no doubt that when 
Congress adopted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, it meant to deal 
with what it saw as a crack epidemic sweeping the country.” Id. at 1156. 
However, the court remarked “when [Congress] directed the most severe 
penalties at distribution of cocaine base, its terminology swept beyond 
crack.” Id. The court recognized that “[w]hile all crack is cocaine base, 
not all cocaine base is crack.” Id. Furthermore, although “cocaine and 
cocaine base are chemically identical . . . Congress clearly intended to 
make a distinction between powder cocaine and the more potent and 
addictive form of smokeable ‘cocaine base’ known as ‘crack’ or ‘rock’ 
cocaine.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that the statute requires “the 
indictment to charge and the jury to find ‘crack’ to trigger the enhanced 
penalties associated with cocaine base.” Id. 
 
Paolini v. Albertson’s Inc., 482 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether stock options constituted wages under Idaho 
Code sections 45–601(7) and 45–613. Id. at 1152. 
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ANALYSIS: Noting that the resolution of appellant’s claim 
presented issues of first impression under Idaho law, the 9th Circuit 
certified the question to the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The Idaho 
Supreme Court granted review of the question and held that “stock 
options do not constitute wages under Chapter 6 of Title 45 of the Idaho 
Code.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: Having determined that stock options did not 
constitute wages under sections 45-601(7) and 45-613 of the Idaho Code, 
the 9th Circuit affirmed “the district court’s dismissal of Paolini’s claim 
that he was terminated for pursuing a wage complaint, in violation of 
Idaho Code [section] 45-613.” Id. at 1153. 
 
In re Ahaza Sys., Inc., 482 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hat ‘ordinary’ in section 547(c)(2)(A) [of the 
Bankruptcy Code] means if the debt in question is a first-time transaction 
between the parties, and what ‘debt’ means when the original agreement 
between two parties is revised.” Id. at 1125. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit first noted that other circuit courts 
addressing the issue “most side with the view that a first-time transaction 
is not per se ineligible for protection from avoidance under section 
547(c)(2).” Id. The court agreed with the weight of authority and 
affirmed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s finding that “‘[i]t would be 
inconsistent with the purpose of the section for Stratos to be prevented 
from receiving the benefit of the ordinary course of business exception’ 
for otherwise routine transactions simply because Stratos never 
previously entered into a transaction with Ahaza.” Id.  
Having determined that first-time debts are eligible for the 
exception, the court next analyzed the “criteria for deciding when a debt 
is incurred ‘in the ordinary course of business,’ albeit for the first time 
between the parties.” Id. The court again examined how other circuits 
treated the issue and concluded that, “when we have no past debt 
between the parties with which to compare the challenged one, the 
instant debt should be compared to the debt agreements into which we 
would expect the debtor and creditor to enter as part of their ordinary 
business operations.” Id. at 1126. The court further stated, “[o]nly if a 
party has never engaged in similar transactions would we consider more 
generally whether the debt is similar to what we would expect of 
similarly situated parties, where the debtor is not sliding into 
bankruptcy.” Id. The court then rejected the trustee’s argument that the 
term “ordinary” should always be assessed by “prevailing business 
standards” and concluded that “section 547(c)(2)(A) still reflects the 
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actual parties’ practices insofar as that is possible and focuses on the 
issuance of debt itself.” Id. The court next turned to the second 
component of the issue, specifically “[w]hen the payment agreement 
between two parties has been revised or restructured, what is the ‘debt’ 
to be considered under section 547(c)(2)(A).” Id. at 1126–27. The court 
surveyed other circuits’ approaches to similar questions in other contexts 
and concluded that “[a] broad understanding of ‘debt,’ encompassing 
both the original and the revised agreement, is consistent with the 
Bankruptcy Code.” Id. at 1127. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “to fulfill section 547(c)(2)(A), a 
first-time debt must be ordinary in relation to this debtor’s and this 
creditor’s past practices when dealing with other, similarly situated 
parties” and “both the pre-Agreement arrangement . . . and the 
Agreement itself are relevant to section 547(a)(2)(A).” Id. at 1126–27. 
 
Johnson v. Aljian, 490 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether an action could be brought under section 20A  
of the Exchange Act of 1934 when “the sole predicate violation . . . was 
not independently actionable because the claim has been dismissed as 
time-barred under its separate period of limitations.” Id. at 780. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “[c]laims under section 20A are 
derivative and therefore require an independent violation of the 
Exchange Act.” Id. at 781. The court construed the term “violates” to 
mean that “a person has satisfied the essential elements of the proscribed 
act regardless of whether an action is commenced within the applicable 
statute of limitations.” Id. at 781–82. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “to maintain a claim under 
section 20A, a plaintiff need not plead an actionable predicate violation.” 
Id. at 785. 
 
Aholelei v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the filing of a third-party complaint, 
without more, waives a state’s immunity.” Id. at 1147. 
ANALYSIS: The court rejected the “contention that the filing of a 
third-party complaint by the State defendants constituted an invocation 
of federal jurisdiction which was incompatible with an intent to preserve 
the defense of sovereign immunity.” Id. at 1148. The court held that 
“State defendants, like other defendants, are allowed to assert legitimate 
alternative defenses.” Id. at 1149. Therefore, the court noted that the 
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filing of a third-party complaint does not retract an immunity defense 
already pleaded. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “the State defendants did not 
waive their sovereign immunity by filing the third-party complaint 
because they had timely asserted immunity prior to filing the third-party 
complaint and the third-party complaint was a defensive move which 
was not incompatible with an intent to preserve sovereign immunity.” Id. 
 
Moreno-Morante v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether “a United States citizen grandchild, in the 
lawful custody of non-citizen grandparents, [met] the statutory definition 
of ‘qualifying relative’ for the purpose of cancellation of removal.” Id. at 
1173. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “‘[c]hild,’ for purposes of 
cancellation of removal, was defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1).” Id. at 
1174. The court indicated that “the plain language at issue is 
unambiguous, and . . . [the] grandchildren do not satisfy its express 
terms.” Id. at 1175. Alternatively, the court explained that “8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(b)(1)(D) simply does not contemplate the cancellation of removal 
based on the hardship to be suffered by a ‘de facto’ child.” Id. at 1176. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that a “United States citizen 
grandchild, in the lawful custody of non-citizen grandparents,” does “not 
meet the statutory definition of ‘child’ for purposes of cancellation of 
removal.” Id. at 1173. The court further reasoned that “[n]either do they 
qualify by virtue of [a] de facto parent-child relationship . . . because 
Congress has specifically precluded such a functional approach to 
defining the term ‘child’ for cancellation of removal purposes.” Id. at 
1178. 
 
Sherman v. Harbin, 486 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2007) 
Editor’s Note—This case resolves “two issues of first impression 
in our bankruptcy jurisprudence.” Id. at 513. 
 
QUESTION ONE: Whether a bankruptcy court “considering the 
feasibility of a plan of reorganization under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11)” 
must have taken into account the “possible effect of a debtor’s ongoing 
civil case with a potential creditor” when that civil case was pending on 
appeal. Id. at 514. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit noted that a bankruptcy court “cannot 
adequately determine a plan’s feasibility for purposes of section 
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1129(a)(11) without evaluating whether a potential future judgment may 
affect the debtor’s ability to implement its plan.” Id. at 518. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “because the bankruptcy court 
failed to consider the consequences of Sherman’s potential success on 
appeal, it clearly erred in failing to discharge its obligations under section 
1129(a)(11).” Id. at 519. 
 
QUESTION TWO: Whether a bankruptcy court “may exercise its 
equitable powers to grant retroactive approval of a post-petition 
financing transaction pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(2).” Id. at 514. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by noting that 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(c)(2) 
and 364(c)(3) state that “[c]hapter 11 debtors in possession are required 
to obtain the approval of the bankruptcy court when they wish to incur 
secured debt.” Id. at 521. The court also recognized that this section has 
been interpreted to require a debtor to obtain the bankruptcy court’s 
authorization before incurring secured debt. Id. The court found an 
exception to this rule, however, and stated that “where the debtor incurs 
debt without first obtaining court authorization, the bankruptcy court 
may exercise its equitable discretion to develop an appropriate remedy, 
provided, of course, that the chosen remedy is consistent with the 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that a bankruptcy court “may 
exercise its equitable powers to grant retroactive approval of a post-
petition financing transaction pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(2).” Id. at 
514. 
 
United States v. Olmos-Esparza, 484 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether a district court could consider previous 
convictions when “calculating sentencing enhancements under section 
2L1.2 of the 2003 Sentencing Guidelines.”  Id. at 1112. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by examining the Sentencing 
Guidelines and found that “[n]either the text nor the application notes 
state that a conviction, as used in this section, must have occurred within 
a particular time period for the enhancement to apply.” Id. at 1113. The 
court then rejected the defendant’s argument that the application notes 
were ambiguous, “since one portion of the commentary expressly 
qualifies the temporal scope of prior convictions for aggravated felonies, 
but says nothing about age limitations as to other predicate convictions.” 
Id. at 1114. In doing so, the court concluded that the maxim of statutory 
construction—“when some statutory provisions expressly mention a 
requirement, the omission of that requirement from other statutory 
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provisions implies that the drafter intended the inclusion of the 
requirement in some instances but not others”—did not apply. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that section 2L1.2 of the Sentencing 
Guidelines “on its face contained no temporal limitation on the prior 
conviction used to enhance sentences for illegal reentry.” Id. at 1116. 
 
Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 486 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: What is the extent to which the Japan Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation Treaty (“FCN Treaty”) preempted state 
employment law. Id. at 1115. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by examining the FCN 
Treaty among others and noted that the “purpose of the Treaties was not 
to give foreign corporations greater rights than domestic companies, but 
instead to assure them the right to conduct business on an equal basis 
without suffering discrimination based on their alienage.” Id. The court 
further noted that other circuits have “consistently held that foreign 
employers do not enjoy immunity from domestic employment laws that 
do not interfere with the employers’ ability to hire their fellow citizens.” 
Id. at 1116. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “article VIII(1), which confers 
on Japanese employers only the limited right to discriminate in favor of 
their fellow citizens for certain managerial and technical positions, does 
not preempt California’s whistle blower protection laws.” Id. at 1118. 
 
United Steel Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC v. NLRB, 482 F.3d 1112 (9th 
Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the National Labor Relations Board (“Board”) 
abused its administrative discretion by agreeing to all aspects of an 
Administrative Law Judge’s decision except the recommendation of a 
Gissel order to bargain as a remedy for unfair labor practices that 
interfered with a representational vote. Id. at 1115. 
ANALYSIS: The court reviewed the Board’s choice of remedy “for a 
clear abuse of discretion.” Id. at 1116. The court found that a Gissel 
order functioned as an exceptional remedy appropriate only where the 
Board found that severe labor violations made the favored method of 
deciding collective bargaining status through an election infeasible. Id. at 
1117. Because a Gissel order represented an exceptional remedy, the 
court rejected the union’s attempt to draw a parallel between the 
appellate review of decisions not to issue a Gissel order with the probing 
review used when a Gissel order issued. Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The court held that “the Board’s decision to order an 
unextraordinary remedy does not merit an extraordinary explanation.” Id. 
 
Abebe v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether a lawful permanent resident convicted of the 
sexual abuse of a minor, an aggravated felony, was entitled to 
“discretionary relief from removal under former section 212(c) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) . . . because the ground of 
deportability charged by the government” lacked a comparable ground of 
inadmissibility under INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) and recent case 
law. Id. at 1094. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by noting that the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) had held that under section 212(c) of the 
INA, “relief is available only for aliens facing deportation on a ground 
with some tight connection to a ground of excludability that could have 
been waived under section 212(c) had the alien traveled abroad.” Id. at 
1099. The court added that “the BIA and the courts have regularly denied 
relief where the ground of deportability lacks a corresponding ground of 
excludability.” Id. In a 2005 case, the court explained, the BIA ruled 
“that an alien who was deported for an aggravated felony ‘sexual abuse 
of a minor’ conviction was ineligible for section 212(c) relief on the 
basis of the comparable grounds rule” because “‘the moral turpitude 
ground for exclusion addresses a . . . much broader category of offenses 
than the aggravated felony sexual abuse of a minor charge.’” Id. at 1100. 
In rejecting the petitioner’s argument that such recent decisions by the 
BIA did not deserve deference, the court found that the decisions were 
consistent with statutory, agency, and judicial precedent. Id. at 1104. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the BIA’s published cases and 
the 9th Circuit’s decisions considering the issue “have consistently held 
section 212(c) relief to be unavailable to aliens deportable on grounds 
that lack comparable grounds for exclusion whether or not their conduct 
could also be characterized as involving moral turpitude.” Id. at 1105. 
 
United States v. Ruiz-Chairez, 493 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “Whether punishing illegal reentrants more severely 
than other felons with the same prior criminal records violates equal 
protection.” Id. at 1091. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit first noted that it had previously 
determined 8 U.S.C. § 1326, a statute which prohibits deported non-
citizens from reentering the United States, to be “a legitimate exercise of 
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Congress’ immigration power.” Id. The court explained that under the 
applicable sentencing guidelines, minimum sentences for illegal reentry 
convictions were increased following removal for certain felony drug 
trafficking offenses or “crime[s] of violence.” Id. The court noted that 
the Sentencing Guidelines could be “challenged on equal protection 
grounds,” but pointed out that “the relevant test [was] whether the 
classification [was] ‘rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest.’” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the “enhancement level in [the 
Sentencing Guidelines] has a rational basis and serves [the] legitimate 
government interest” of discouraging non-citizens “who have committed 
drug-related and violent crimes” from illegally re-entering the United 
States. Id. 
 
United States v. Gamba, 483 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a district court judge may lawfully appoint 
a magistrate judge to preside over closing argument at a felony criminal 
trial if the defendant’s counsel has, for trial tactic or legal strategy 
purposes, agreed to such appointment.” Id. at 945. 
ANALYSIS: The court considered “the degree to which a defendant 
himself must be involved in the decision to allow a magistrate judge to 
preside over closing argument.” Id. at 947. The 9th Circuit recognized 
that “[n]umerous courts have held that defense counsel may waive 
constitutional rights of the accused as part of the trial strategy or tactics.” 
Id. The court explained that “where defense counsel consents to proceed 
before a magistrate judge for tactical or strategic reasons, there is neither 
a constitutional nor a statutory impediment to delegating closing 
argument in criminal cases to magistrate judges.” Id. at 950. Finally, the 
court noted, “[f]ew defendants have the training to permit them to 
appreciate the various legal concerns at issue when a magistrate judge is 
delegated authority to preside over closing argument.” Id. at 949. The 
court indicated that “[b]ecause an attorney understands the importance of 
consistency in a trial proceeding, he is best equipped to make an 
immediate determination as to the risks or benefits of accepting a 
magistrate judge as a substitute for a district court judge.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit determined that “[w]here the 
decision is one of trial tactics or legal strategy, defense counsel may 
waive the defendant’s right to have an Article III judge preside over 
closing argument without the defendant’s personal, informed consent.” 
Id. at 950. 
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Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a judgment pending appeal should be given 
preclusive effect in an arbitration.” Id. at 883. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit noted that its precedents indicated “the 
benefits of giving a judgment preclusive effect pending appeal outweigh 
any risks of a later reversal of that judgment.” Id. The court further 
recognized that the 6th, 7th, and 8th Circuits held that “where the 
prerequisites for collateral estoppel are satisfied, arbitrators must give 
preclusive effect to prior federal judgments.” Id. at 880. The 9th Circuit 
agreed with those decisions. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “[a]rbitrators are not free 
to ignore the preclusive effect of prior judgments under the doctrines of 
res judicata and collateral estoppel, although they generally are entitled 
to determine in the first instance whether to give the prior judicial 
determination preclusive effect.” Id. 
 
Sigma Micro Corp. v. Healthcentral.com, 504 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether Local Rule 9015-2(b), which upon the 
fulfillment of certain conditions automatically withdraws an action from 
the Bankruptcy Court to the district court, was valid. Id. at 781, 784. 
ANALYSIS: The court found no ambiguity in Federal Rule of 
Bankruptcy Procedure 9029, which “grants district courts the power to 
adopt their own local rules,” but subsequently limits this grant of power 
and “states a local bankruptcy rule must . . . be consistent with the Acts 
of Congress and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.” Id. at 784. The 
court found “Local Rule 9015-2(b) to be invalid as it establishes a 
procedure for withdrawing the district court’s jurisdictional reference 
inconsistent with the Acts of Congress and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure.” Id. The court cited two reasons for this finding: “First, Local 
Rule 9015-2(b) allows for the bankruptcy court to ‘withdraw[]’ the 
jurisdictional reference, whereas 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) [an “Act of 
Congress”] and Rule 5011(a) [a “Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 
Procedure”] make it explicit that only a district court may ‘withdraw’ the 
jurisdictional reference[,]” and “[s]econd, Local Rule 9015-2(b) permits 
a party to obtain a withdrawal of the reference upon a ‘Motion for 
Certification’, while 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) and Rule 5011(a) make it clear 
that a party may only obtain a withdrawal of the reference upon a 
‘Motion for Withdrawal.’” Id. at 785. 
CONCLUSION: The court found no error in the bankruptcy court’s 
decision “not to adhere to this invalid rule and . . . retain jurisdiction over 
the debtor’s action for all pre-trial proceedings.” Id. 
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DirecTV, Inc. v. Huynh, 503 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the “use of unloopers constituted assembly 
and modification of piracy devices in violation of [47 U.S.C.] § 605(e)(4) 
[of the Federal Communications Act].” Id. at 853. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained that an “unlooper” is a 
reprogramming device used to pirate satellite television by restoring 
functionality to an access card previously disabled by the satellites 
provider. Id. at 850. The court then construed the statute as a “two-tiered 
punishment rubric” designed to punish “upstream pirates” more severely 
than “end-users.” Id. at 853. Thus, the court reasoned that “[b]ecause 
reprogramming access cards and inserting these modified access cards in 
DirecTV receivers is necessary to intercept signals in violation of 
subsection (a), treating these actions violations of subsection (e)(4) 
would collapse the distinction Congress established.” Id at 854–55. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held “that section 605(e)(4) does not 
apply to individual end-users.” Id. at 855. 
 
Indivos Corp. v. Excel Innovations, Inc., 502 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the usual standard for granting a preliminary 
injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) applied to non-debtor proceedings. 
Id. at 1093. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) “gives the 
bankruptcy courts power to stay actions that are not subject to the section  
363(a) automatic stay but ‘threaten the integrity of a bankrupt’s estate.’” 
Id. The court concluded that Congress intended the “usual preliminary 
injunction standard” to apply to section 105(a) and that the automatic 
stay “did not apply to suits against non-debtors.” Id. at 1094. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held “that when a debtor applies for 
a 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) preliminary injunction to stay a proceeding in 
which the debtor is not a party, the bankruptcy court must balance the 
debtor’s likelihood of success in reorganization against the relative 
hardship of the parties, as well as consider the public interest if 
warranted.” Id. at 1089. 
 
AFGE Local 1 v. Stone, 502 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the CSRA [Civil Service Reform Act of 
1978] precludes colorable constitutional claims sounding in equity where 
the plaintiff has no other remedy.” Id. at 1034. 
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ANALYSIS: The court found that the Supreme Court had interpreted 
the CSRA so that it “cannot be reasonably read as satisfying the 
‘heightened showing’ of congressional intent necessary to construe a 
federal statute completely ‘to preclude judicial review of constitutional 
claims.’” Id. at 1036. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the CSRA “does not clearly state 
an intention on the part of Congress to preclude judicial review of 
constitutional claims.” Id. at 1039. Pursuant to the holding, the court 
indicated that the plaintiffs-appellants were therefore “entitled to seek 
equitable relief based on the alleged violation of their First Amendment 
rights.” Id. 
 
Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether immigrants who were “conditionally paroled” 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) were necessarily “paroled into the United 
States” for purposes of adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent 
resident under section 1255(a). Id. at 1112. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that the regulation permitting “parole 
into the United States” only applied to “arriving aliens” or 
“inadmissible” aliens. Id. at 1116. Since the plaintiff was a “removable” 
alien “apprehended inside the United States after crossing the border 
illegally,” the court indicated that the plaintiff “was conditionally paroled 
under the authority of section 1226(a) rather than paroled into the United 
States under the authority of section 1182(d)(5)(A).” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that conditional parolees under 
section 1226(a) were [not] ‘paroled into the United States’ within the 
meaning of section 1255(a) and [were] thus [in]eligible for adjustment of 
status under that section.” Id. 
 
Camins v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) abrogated the old 
section 101(a)(13) of the INA and the Fleuti doctrine. Id. at 878. 
ANALYSIS: The court looked to other circuits for guidance on this 
question and adopted the view espoused by the BIA and the 3rd, 4th, and 
5th Circuits. Id. The court recognized the reasoning from In re Collado-
Munoz, where the “BIA concluded that IIRIRA . . . had changed the INA 
so that the Fleuti doctrine no longer applied.” Id. The court adopted the 
holdings from its sister courts, that “[w]hen the BIA explicitly adopts in 
a published opinion a particular interpretation of an ambiguous provision 
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of the INA, we apply Chevron deference to its interpretation and adopt 
the agency’s view ‘so long as it is reasonable.’” Id. at 879. 
CONCLUSION: Accordingly, the court ruled “in light of the 
deference owed the BIA, that IIRIRA section 301(a)(13) abrogated the 
Fleuti doctrine.” Id. at 880. 
 
Webb v. Smart Document Solutions, LLC, 499 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 
2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether designated agents, such as personal 
attorneys, can count as the ‘individual’ [in the Department of Health and 
Human Services “DHHS” regulations implementing the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 “HIPAA”] in order 
to obtain the reasonable, cost-based fee.” Id. at 1084. 
ANALYSIS: The court looked to the statutory language of the 
regulation holding that “DHHS defined ‘individual’ as ‘the person who is 
the subject of the protected health information.’” Id. Thus, on its face, the 
court reasoned that the “regulations restrict the fee limitations to requests 
made by the individual and concretely define ‘individual’ in a way that 
excludes others acting on that individual’s behalf.” Id.  Therefore, the 
court premised its holding on the canon of statutory construction which 
“creates a presumption that when a statute designates certain persons, 
things, or manners of operation, all omissions should be understood as 
exclusions.” Id. In addition, the court considered the regulatory history 
and concluded that it “makes clear that DHHS did not intend for private 
attorneys to receive the reduced fees.” Id. at 1085. 
CONCLUSION: Based on the reasons espoused above, the court held 
that “the HIPAA regulations require the reduced rate only when the 
individual himself requests the records.” Id. at 1080. 
 
Singh v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the REAL ID Act precludes habeas review 
of IAC claims that arise from an attorney’s failure to file a timely 
petition for review of the BIA’s [Board of Immigration Appeals] 
decision.” Id. at 975. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis with a review of the 
statutory background of the REAL ID Act, finding that between 1961 
and 1996, Congress attempted to limit the scope of habeas review 
available to aliens. Id. at 976. The 9th Circuit recognized, however, that 
despite Congress’ efforts, the Supreme Court expanded judicial review 
for aliens in INS v. St. Cyr. Id. The court then noted that under section 
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106 of the REAL ID Act, Congress “expressly eliminated habeas review 
over all final orders of removal, but restored to the appellate courts 
jurisdiction over ‘constitutional claims or questions of law.’” Id. at 977. 
Under the REAL ID Act’s statutory language, the court held that both 
sections 1252(a)(5) and 1252(b)(9) permit judicial review for an order of 
removal. Id. at 978. Thus, based on a close review of the legislative 
history and statutory language, the court held that the REAL ID Act 
permitted habeas review of a final order of removal within the meaning 
of section 1252. Id. at 979–80. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the legislative history and 
statutory language of the REAL ID Act indicated that the statute arising 
from an attorney’s failure to file a timely petition for review of the BIA’s 
decision. Id. at 980. 
 
Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 499 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether, or under what circumstances, appellate 
attorney’s fees are ‘costs on appeal’ that a district court may require an 
appellant to secure in a bond ordered under . . . [Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure, “FRCP”] 7.” Id. at 953. 
ANALYSIS: The court concluded “that a district court may require 
an appellant to secure appellate attorney’s fees in a Rule 7 bond, but only 
if an applicable fee-shifting statute includes them in its definition of 
recoverable costs, and only if the appellee is eligible to recover such 
fees.” Id. The court first noted that FRCP 7 derived from FRCP 73(c), 
which instructs that “the district court may require an appellant to file a 
bond or provide other security in any form and amount necessary to 
ensure payment of costs on appeal.” Id. at 954–55. The court then 
observed a circuit split in which the 3rd and D.C. circuits held that costs 
of appeal as per Rule 7 “are simply those that may be taxed against an 
unsuccessful litigant . . . and do not include attorney’s fees that may be 
assessed on appeal,” but the majority rule, adopted by the 2nd, 6th, and 
11th circuits, found that the district court may order security for them if 
they were recoverable under a fee-shifting statute. Id. at 955. The court 
rejected arguments that Rule 39 defined costs for purposes of Rule 7. Id. 
at 958.  Instead, the court held that “[t]he fee-shifting provision in 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, includes attorney’s fees in 
its definition of costs recoverable by a prevailing plaintiff,” because Rule 
7 does not define “cost on appeal,” does not use Rule 39 to define its 
costs, and the canons of statutory construction dictate that “each word of 
a statute should, if possible, be given effect.” Id. at 953, 958. The court 
found, however, that because the provision in the instant case did not 
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“authorize taxing attorney’s fees against a class member/objector 
challenging a settlement in an antitrust suit,” the Clayton Act did not 
require security under Rule 7. Id. at 953. 
CONCLUSION: “[A] district court may require an appellant to 
secure appellate attorney’s fees in a Rule 7 bond, but only if an 
applicable fee-shifting statute includes them in its definition of 
recoverable costs, and only if the appellee is eligible to recover such 
fees.” Id. 
 
Phillips v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 497 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 
2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in American 
Pipe & Construction Company v. Utah permitting “tolling for a plaintiff 
who files a separate action” pending certification of the class in a class 
action lawsuit. Id. at 1026. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “[w]e should not allow a 
plaintiff to file an individual suit, which is in essence a signal that the 
plaintiff is opting out of a class, and then simultaneously give the same 
plaintiff class action benefits.” Id. at 1026–27. The court explained that 
“[t]olling is not ‘intended to be a tool to manipulate limitations periods 
for parties who, intending all along to pursue individual claims, assert 
reliance on the proposed class action just long enough to validate their 
otherwise time barred claims.’” Id. at 1027. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that an “individual who filed a 
separate suit pending a decision on class certification loses the benefit of 
any statute of limitations tolling under American Pipe.” Id. at 1027. 
 
Emmert Indus. Corp. v. Artisan Assocs., 497 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the Interstate Commerce Commission 
Termination Act (“ICCTA”) limitations period codified at 49 U.S.C. § 
14705(a), “applies solely to claims for charges owed under a filed tariff.” 
Id. at 986. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that section 14705(a) mandated that 
“[a] carrier providing transportation or service . . . must begin a civil 
action to recover charges for transportation or service provided by the 
carrier within eighteen months after the claim accrues.” Id. at 986–87. 
First, the court reasoned that “there is no tariff requirement on the face of 
the statute” and “[b]ecause the statute is complete and unambiguous . . . 
we will not read such a requirement into the statute.” Id. at 987. Second, 
the court explained that “because the term ‘charges’ is not statutorily 
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defined, it should be interpreted according to its ordinary, everyday 
meaning,” and “[t]he common meaning of ‘charges’ does not necessarily 
relate to debt owed pursuant to a tariff, but also includes a price, cost, 
expense, or debt owed under contractual obligation.” Id. The court 
acknowledged that “to determine the meaning of section 14705(a) we 
must consider the particular language at issue in context of the overall 
statutory scheme,” but reasoned that “because the word ‘charges’ as used 
in other sections of the ICCTA includes both tariff and non-tariff 
charges, the same meaning should apply to the word ‘charges’ in section 
14705(a).” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “nothing in the text or context of 
section 14705(a) indicate[d] that the eighteen-month limitations period is 
restricted to claims seeking charges under a filed tariff, or even to claims 
arising under federal law.” Id. at 14. 
 
Lockett v. Catalina Channel Express, Inc., 496 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 
2007) 
QUESTION: Whether a ferry operator’s one-time refusal to allow a 
blind passenger to take a guide dog into ferry’s lounge area, constituted a 
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Id. at 1063–
65. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit reasoned that 28 C.F.R. § 36.208 
provides that an individual can be denied an accommodation when the 
individual “poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others.” Id. at 
1065–66. Additionally, the court found that the passenger’s request for 
passage in the lounge created a dilemma for the ferry operator because its 
prohibition on animals in the lounge was adopted in response to a 
passenger’s assertion of an allergy to animal dander. Id. at 1065. Thus, 
the court noted that the ferry operator’s employees had to decide 
immediately whether to potentially expose passengers in the lounge to 
dander or ask the disabled passenger to ride in the general passenger 
area.  Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that the ferry operator faced a 
potential threat to the health and safety of others, and that 29 C.F.R. § 
36.208 permitted the ferry operator to ask the disabled passenger to 
travel in the general passenger area while the operator investigated the 
matter. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a ferry operator’s one-time 
refusal to allow a blind passenger to take a guide dog into a ferry’s 
lounge area did not violate the ADA, based on the fact that the lounge 
had been designated as an area free of animal dander per another 
passenger’s request. Id. at 1067. 
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United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether a police stop based upon allegations of 
involvement in a misdemeanor crime qualified as a reasonable search 
under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1075. 
ANALYSIS: The court surveyed Fourth Amendment Supreme Court 
precedents, noting United States v. Hensley in particular. Id. at 1075–76. 
The court acknowledged the methodology of Hensley, but distinguished 
the underlying crime claimed as the basis for the stop in that case, noting 
that the 6th Circuit found Hensley inapplicable to misdemeanor crimes. 
Id. at 1075. After surveying numerous state court decisions as persuasive 
authority, the 9th Circuit rejected a bright line distinction between 
felonies and misdemeanors, favoring a test that “consider[ed] the nature 
of the misdemeanor offense in question, with particular attention to the 
potential for ongoing or repeated danger . . . and any risk of escalation . . 
. .” Id. at 1081. 
CONCLUSION: The court reversed the conviction and remanded to 
the district court, finding the search unreasonable in light of the relatively 
harmless misdemeanor conduct being investigated and the failure of the 




Been v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 495 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “Whether section 202(a) of the Packers and Stockyards 
Act (“PSA”), 7 U.S.C. § 181 et seq., requires a plaintiff to prove that an 
allegedly ‘unfair practice’ injures or is likely to injure competition.” Id. 
at 1222. 
ANALYSIS: The court initially interpreted the words of the statute 
“in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve.” Id. at 1227. The 
court then followed the precedents of the 7th Circuit and the 11th Circuit, 
that held “‘unfair[ness]’ under section 202(a) require[d] evidence that the 
challenged practice will likely lead to a competitive injury [, and] . . . a 
claim brought under section 202(a) required some showing of a 
competitive injury or the likelihood [thereof].” Id. at 1228, 1229. The 
court reasoned that “[section 202](a) is a general prohibition on ‘unfair, 
unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practice[s]’” which provided “no 
further guidance on what type of act falls within its parameters.” Id. at 
1229. The court further reasoned that “[n]ot to require a showing of 
competitive injury or the likelihood thereof would make a federal case 
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out of every breach of contract,” and concluded that “[n]othing in the 
PSA suggests Congress intended this result.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that section 202(a) of the PSA 
required a plaintiff “who claimed that a defendant was ‘unfair’ to show 
that such conduct results in or is likely to result in an injury to 
competition.” Id. at 1238. 
 
Hutton Contracting Co. v. City of Coffeyville, 487 F.3d 772 (10th Cir. 
2007) 
QUESTION: Whether, under Kansas law, a party in breach of 
contract “may recover liquidated damages for the portion of a divisible 
delay not caused by its own breach.” Id. at 783. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “for some time . . . Kansas 
contract law has followed the parties’ intentions rather than formalism . . 
. . [a]nd when there are gaps in the contract, Kansas courts will fill them 
with terms that are ‘reasonable in the circumstances.’” Id. at 784. The 
court reasoned that “[a]pportionment of damages based on fault 
comports with modern notions of fairness . . . [a]nd such apportionment 
can encourage efficient behavior.” Id. The court then reviewed several 
decisions throughout the past thirty years to find that “a strong majority” 
supports such a view. Id. at 785. 
CONCLUSION: The court “believe[d] that Kansas would adopt the 
modern view and allow liquidated damages to be apportioned when 
faced with damages that are in fact divisible . . . . [a]nd affirm[ed] the 
district court’s decision to apportion delay in awarding liquidated 
damages.” Id. at 786. 
 
Rupp v. United Sec. Bank, 489 F.3d 1072 (10th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a ‘director emeritus’ is a ‘director’ within 
the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.” Id. at 1075. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[w]hen the term ‘director’ is used 
in reference to a corporation, as it is used in the statutory definition of 
‘insider,’ the term plainly means a person who is a member of the 
governing board of the corporation and participates in corporate 
governance.” Id. at 1077. Accordingly, the court turned to the meaning 
of “emeritus” as used by the parties in the case and defined “emeritus” as  
“holding after retirement (as from professional or academic office) an 
honorary title corresponding to that held last during active service.” Id. at 
1078. 
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CONCLUSION: The court found that the undisputed facts and 
legislative intent established “that [the debtor], a ‘director emeritus,’ was 
not a ‘director’ within the meaning of the definition” of 11 U.S.C. § 
547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 1079. 
 
Co. Judicial Dep’t v. Sweeney, 492 F.3d 1189 (10th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether “restitution ordered pursuant to juvenile 
delinquency proceedings is dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3),” 
a statute preventing debtors from discharging restitution arising from 
convictions of crimes. Id. at 1190. 
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit noted that it had previously found 
juvenile delinquency to be an “‘an adjudication of status—not a criminal 
conviction.’” Id. at 1191. The court explained that “[t]his interpretation 
[was] consistent with the purposes of the federal Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention Act,” which included de-stigmatizing past 
criminal convictions and fostering rehabilitation. Id. The court 
emphasized that “an adjudication of juvenile delinquency is not 
equivalent to a conviction precisely because [the Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention Act] punishes ‘violation[s]’ of the law that 
‘would have been . . . crime[s] if committed by an adult . . . with a 
classification of ‘status’ as opposed to ‘criminal conviction.’” Id. While 
acknowledging that the statute created a “loophole” for juvenile 
delinquents defaulting on awards of restitution, the court declined to 
legislate from the bench to change the statute. Id. at 1192. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3) “as 
written does not encompass juvenile-delinquency-related restitution,” 
therefore allowing for the discharge of such debts. Id. 
 
United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether police may stop a vehicle based on suspicion 
of a completed misdemeanor. Id. at 1141. 
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit first looked to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Hensley, where the Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment permits police officers to conduct investigatory stops if they 
have a “reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, 
that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection 
with a completed felony.” Id. The Supreme Court did not indicate in 
Hensley whether the same rule applies to misdemeanors. Id. The court 
next noted that the 6th and 9th Circuits are split on the issue, and 
compared Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford Twp., which held that 
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“[p]olice may . . . make a stop when they have reasonable suspicion of a 
completed felony, though not of a mere completed misdemeanor,” with 
United States v. Grigg, which held that “in reviewing the reasonableness 
of a stop to investigate a completed misdemeanor, a court must consider 
the nature of the misdemeanor offense in question, with particular 
attention to the potential for ongoing or repeated danger . . . and any risk 
of escalation.” Id. 
The court applied the balancing test from Hensley to determine the 
constitutionality of investigatory stops by balancing “the nature and 
quality of the intrusion on personal security against the importance of the 
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” Id. The court 
stated that “governmental interest in crime prevention and detection, 
necessarily implicated in a stop to investigate ongoing or imminent 
criminal conduct, may not be present when officers are investigating past 
criminal conduct,” however, “a stop to investigate past criminal activity 
may . . . serve the governmental interest in solving crimes and bringing 
offenders to justice.” Id. at 1142. This interest is particularly strong when 
the criminal activity involves a threat to public safety. Id. The court then 
considered whether, “balanced against the nature of the intrusion, the 
stop was reasonable.” Id. at 1143. The 10th Circuit defined an 
investigatory stop as “brief” and “non-intrusive.” Id. The court noted that 
each analysis must be fact-based to ensure that the investigatory stop met 
the brief and non-intrusive definitions. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court determined that “[b]alanced against the 
strong governmental interest in solving crime, the relatively limited 
intrusion on personal security occasioned by an investigatory stop was 
warranted and the officers’ seizure of Mr. Moran was not unreasonable.” 
Id. 
 
United States v. Contreras, 505 F.3d 1031 (10th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for 
obstruction of justice, United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 
3C1.1 (2002), applies when a defendant’s obstructive conduct occurred 
during the prosecution of state charges preceding the federal indictment, 
but both federal and state charges were based on the same underlying 
conduct.” Id. at 1034. 
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit noted that seven other circuits had 
“considered whether the obstruction of a state investigation based on the 
same facts as the eventual federal conviction merits a section 3C1.1 
enhancement,” and that “of those circuits, six have held that obstruction 
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of the state proceeding does qualify for the enhancement; only one held 
that it did not.” Id. at 1039. 
CONCLUSION: The court followed the majority of circuits and 
found that obstruction of justice during a state proceeding still qualifies 




Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826 (11th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: [W]hether individual defendants may be personally 
liable for violating the ADA’s [Americans with Disabilities Act] anti-
retaliation provision when the ‘act or practice’ opposed by the plaintiff is 
made unlawful by the ADA provisions concerning employment” and 
whether there is “individual liability under” the Florida Omnibus AIDS 
Act (“FOAA”). Id. at 831–34. 
ANALYSIS: The court held “that individuals are not amenable to 
private suit for violating the ADA’s anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12203, where the act or practice opposed by the plaintiff is made 
unlawful by the ADA provisions concerning employment, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
12111–12117.” Id. at 828. Additionally, the court held “that an 
individual may not be sued privately in his or her personal capacity for 
violating the FOAA’s employment discrimination provisions.” Id. at 835. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal of Albra’s complaint against the defendants, and denied the 
defendants’ motion for [FRCP] Rule 38 sanctions. Id. 
 
Jenkins v. Bellsouth Corp., 491 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a district court has the authority to 
circumvent the ten-day deadline for obtaining interlocutory review of an 
order denying class certification by vacating and reentering that order, 
after the aggrieved parties filed and this [c]ourt dismissed an untimely 
petition for interlocutory appeal.” Id. at 1289. 
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit joined the 10th, 7th, and 5th Circuits 
in rejecting the plaintiffs’ “attempts to circumvent the ten-day deadline 
of Rule 23(f)” through interlocutory review, noting that “what counts . . . 
is the original order denying or granting class certification, not a later 
order that maintains the status quo.” Id. at 1291. The court’s decision did 
not leave plaintiffs without relief; it simply prevented them from 
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“effectively defeat[ing] the function of the ten-day limit.” Id. The court 
noted that the plaintiffs could later still “appeal the denial of a class 
certification following the entry of a final judgment” but were prevented 
from pursuing an interlocutory appeal. Id. at 1292. 
CONCLUSION: Because the district court lacked the “authority to 
circumvent the ten-day deadline” provided in Rule 23(f) by vacating and 
reentering its earlier order, the petition was untimely. Id. The court 
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Id. 
 
United States v. Clemendor, No. 06-15537, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
13799 (11th Cir. June 13, 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the penalty for an offense committed while on 
release under 18 U.S.C. § 3147, “and consequent assessment of section 
2J1.7’s 3-level increase to the offense level to enhance a sentence,” was 
applicable “to the crime of failing to appear under section 3146.” Id. at 
10. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that “[t]he statute unambiguously 
applies to defendants . . . who are convicted of an offense committed 
while on release.” Id. at 12. Agreeing with the 4th Circuit, the 11th 
Circuit recognized that “failure to appear which violate[s] section 3146 . 
. . is clearly an offense committed while on release.” Id. at 12. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “[b]ecause the plain and 
unambiguous language of section 3147 makes clear that the statute 
applies, without exception, to offenses committed while on release under 
Chapter 207 of Title 18, [a] violation of section 3146 comes within the 
ambit of section 3147. Moreover, application of the sentencing 
enhancement of section 3147 to a section 3146 offense d[id] not amount 
to double counting, nor d[id] it implicate principles of Double Jeopardy.” 
Id. at 13. 
 
Lobo v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 488 F.3d 891 (11th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the Seaman’s Wage Act, which grants seamen 
access to federal courts, “can be superseded by an agreement to arbitrate” 
falling under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (“the Convention”). Id. at 894. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “the Convention compels federal 
courts to direct qualifying disputes to arbitration.” Id. at 895. 
Additionally, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the Supreme Court noted 
that the Convention persuasively illustrated the congressional policy 
favoring “uniform enforcement of arbitration agreements.” Id. at 896. 
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The 11th Circuit therefore ruled that “to nullify the arbitration provision 
here would hinder the purpose of the Convention and subvert 
congressional intent.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument 
and affirmed the district court’s dismissal in favor of arbitration. Id. at 
896. 
 
Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether a falsely convicted individual seeking 
compensation for deprivation of liberty under section 1983 must have 
demonstrated that a law enforcement officer, who allegedly withheld 
exculpatory evidence from the prosecution, “acted with a level of 
culpability consisting of more than mere negligence.” Id. at 1306. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[n]ot every action by a state actor 
that results in a loss of liberty under the Due Process Clause gives rise to 
liability under section 1983.” Id. at 1307. Furthermore, the court 
recognized the Supreme Court’s express statement that a state official’s 
negligence or lack of due care could not trigger protection under the Due 
Process Clause. Id. at 1308. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that a law enforcement 
official’s negligence or inadvertence in withholding exculpatory material 
from prosecution, which in turn caused the defendant to be convicted at 
trial, could not provide a basis for liability under a section 1983 action 
seeking compensation for loss of liberty. Id. 
 
Delgado v. Att’y Gen., 487 F.3d 855 (11th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a petitioner’s spouse is eligible for 
derivative benefits under the withholding statute.” Id. at 858. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that “[w]here Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another 
section of the same Act” or “knows how to say something but chooses 
not to” then the omission or silence is assumed to be controlling.  Id. at 
862. “[A]lthough the asylum statute explicitly creates derivative rights 
for the spouse of a petitioner, the withholding statute contains no 
mention of derivative rights . . . Congress’s silence thus dictates our 
holding . . . .” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the petitioner’s spouse was not 
entitled to derivative benefits under the withholding statute. Id. 
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United States v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr. of Fla., Inc., 486 F.3d 1248 
(11th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether student medical residents were eligible “to 
assert the ‘student exemption’ from Federal Insurance Contributions Act 
(“FICA”) taxation found in 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(10).” 
ANALYSIS: The court found that students who were both employed 
and attending classes at the same school, college, or university were not 
taxable to the employer under FICA. Id. at 1250. The court recognized 
that “the applicable regulations provide that an employee whose services 
are ‘incident to and for the purpose of pursuing a course of study’ has the 
status of a student” Id. at 1250. The court further found it improper to 
“rel[y] on legislative history without first determining whether the 
language was ambiguous.” Id. at 1251. The court explained that “[b]y its 
plain terms, the student exemption does not limit the types of services 
that qualify for the exemption. Whether a medical resident is a ‘student’ 
and whether he is employed by a ‘school, college, or university’ are 
separate factual inquiries . . . .” Id. at 1252. Finally, the court indicated 
that “[i]f Congress had wanted to make medical residents ineligible for 
the student exemption, it could have easily crafted a specific exclusion . . 
. .” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “medical residents enrolled in 
graduate medical education programs are [not] precluded, as a matter of 
law, from seeking to rely on the student exemption to FICA taxation . . . 
.” Id. at 1253. 
 
Centrex Corp. v. United States, 486 F.3d 1369 (11th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether “fee awards [could] be assessed based on 
claims of bad faith primary conduct.” Id. at 1372. 
ANALYSIS: The court held that “authorizing a court to shift fees 
based solely on bad faith conduct that forms the basis for the substantive 
claim for relief would undermine the American Rule by penalizing a 
party who raises good faith defenses to claims of liability for bad faith 
conduct.” Id. The court noted that “a case in which a district court . . . 
award[s] attorney fees based solely on bad faith primary conduct . . . 
[did] not represent the prevailing view of the bad faith exception at 
common law . . . .” Id. at 1373. The court noted that “the Supreme Court 
approved an attorney fee award based not on conduct giving rise to the 
substantive claim but, rather, on the defendant’s ‘willful and persistent’ 
bad faith treatment of that claim after it accrued[,]” and that “[o]ther 
Supreme Court cases, including more recent opinions, use language 
suggesting that abuse of the judicial process refers to abusive conduct 
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during litigation rather than bad faith primary conduct.” Id. Thus, the 
court found that the congressional intent of the Equal Access to Justice 
Act should not be read to alter the common law fee-shifting rule. Id. at 
1375. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “fee awards cannot be assessed 
based on claims of bad faith primary conduct.” Id. at 1372. 
 
Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 489 F.3d 1156 (11th 
Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the Conte Bros. test was “the proper test for 
determining whether a party has prudential standing to bring a false 
advertising claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§1125(a).” Id. at 1159. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that the Conte Bros. test “‘provides 
appropriate flexibility in application to address factually disparate 
scenarios that may arise in the future, while at the same time supplying a 
principled means for addressing standing under . . . section 43(a).’” Id. at 
1164. The 11th Circuit also noted that “‘two prominent commentaries 
have endorsed this standard” and that “under this standard, ‘standing 
under the Lanham Act does not turn on the label placed on the 
relationship between the parties.’” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “to determine whether a 
party has prudential standing to bring a false advertising claim under 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a court should consider and weigh the . 
. . factors” set forth in the Conte Bros. case. Id. at 1163. 
 
Buckner v. Fla. Habilitation Network, Inc., 489 F.3d 1151 (11th Cir. 
2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the court’s level of deference to 29 C.F.R. §§ 
552.3 and 552.109(a) should fall under Chevron or Skidmore. Id. at 1155. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that “[t]he appropriateness of 
granting Chevron deference to the DOL [Department of Labor] 
regulation defining ‘domestic service employment,’ section 552.3” had 
not been a contentious issue. Id. The 11th Circuit noted that the Supreme 
Court recently recognized “that section 552.109(a) is entitled to Chevron 
deference and is enforceable.” Id. The court of appeals further noted that 
the Supreme Court addressed the relevance of section 552.3 to conclude 
that although the regulation was valid, “section 552.109(a) is controlling 
on the issue of third party employment.”  Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that section 552.109(a) was 
subject to Chevron deference, and although section 552.3 remained valid, 
section 552.109 controlled on the issue of third party employment. Id. 
 
United States v. Orisnord, 483 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “Whether ‘fleeing and eluding’ . . . constitutes a ‘crime 
of violence’ for the purposes of [Sentencing Guidelines career-offender 
enhancement] § 4B1.2.” Id. at 1182. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “the language of the Guidelines 
makes clear that the ‘potential risk’ of injury, rather than actual violence 
or actual injury, is the touchstone of a ‘crime of violence.’” Id. In 
addition, the court noted that “[t]he dangerous circumstances 
surrounding a person’s attempt to flee from law enforcement coupled 
with the person’s operation of a motor vehicle most assuredly presents a 
‘potential risk of physical injury’ to others.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court determined “that felony fleeing and 
eluding . . . is a ‘crime of violence’ for purposes of the career-offender 
enhancement” under Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.2. Id. at 1183. 
 
Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: The court analyzed “[t]he proper interpretation of 
CAFA’s [Class Action Fairness Act of 2005] mass action provisions” in 
determining whether a particular “action meets the requirements for 
federal diversity jurisdiction” under the statute. Id. at 1198. 
ANALYSIS: Initially, the court examined the statutory language of 
CAFA and determined that the statute “incorporates into the mass action 
context a number of the requirements for a class action to qualify for 
CAFA diversity jurisdiction.” Id. at 1201. The 11th Circuit determined 
that, under the provisions of CAFA, there are “at least four requirements 
for an action to be deemed a mass action.” Id. at 1202. The court listed 
the requirements as: “(1) an amount in controversy requirement of an 
aggregate of $5,000,000 in claims; (2) a diversity requirement of 
minimal diversity; (3) a numerosity requirement that the action involve 
the monetary claims of 100 or more plaintiffs; and (4) a commonality 
requirement that the plaintiff’s claims involve common questions of law 
or fact.” Id. at 1202–03. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that these requirements “serve 
as threshold requirements for a district court to have subject matter 
jurisdiction over the action as a whole.” Id. at 1206. 
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Usmani v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 1147 (11th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether, in immigration proceedings, the Attorney 
General has discretion to deny a petition for adjustment of status under 
INA [Immigration and Nationality Act] § 245(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), 
once the petitioner is statutorily eligible for adjustment.” Id. at 1148–49. 
ANALYSIS: Examining the statutory language of the INA, the court 
determined “that the plain language of section 245(i) indicates 
Congressional intent that the IJ [immigration judge] have discretion” to 
adjust immigration status. Id. at 1151. The court reasoned that 
“Congress’s omission in section 245(i) of the phrase ‘in his discretion’ 
does not establish that Congress intended adjustments under section 
245(i) to be mandatory, and the BIA’s [Board of Immigration Appeals] 
interpretation of section 245(i) as discretionary is a permissible, and 
logical, construction.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held “that section 245(i) [of the INA] 
creates discretionary authority for the Attorney General to deny 
adjustment of status.” Id. 
 
McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 
2007) 
QUESTION: Whether and to what extent a private military 
contractor could rely on derivative sovereign immunity stemming from 
the Feres doctrine. Id. at 1341. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained three rationales for barring 
sovereign immunity. Id. at 1342. The court recognized first that the 
nature of the relationship between the government and military personnel 
“means . . . that the government’s liability to soldiers for service-related 
accidents must be governed by a uniform rule.” Id. The court next noted 
that “the uniform rule . . . must be one of no liability.” Id. Further, the 
court explained that “service-related tort claims are often ‘the types of 
claims that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in 
sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and 
effectiveness.’” Id. The court then reasoned, “[s]tatus as a common law 
agent is not a sufficient condition for derivative sovereign immunity.” Id. 
at 1344. Finally, the court declined to extend partial immunity on the 
ground that “an immunity built on Feres would only prevent soldiers—
and would not prevent civilians—from bringing suit against private 
military contractors making or executing sensitive military judgments.” 
Id. at 1353. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that derivative Feres immunity did 
not exist in the instant case, because three of the four recognized Feres 
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rationales did not apply to private contractors. Id. at 1354. The court 
noted that “while protecting sensitive military judgments could 
conceivably ground an immunity” the Feres doctrine was “an 
inappropriate vehicle because it would single out soldiers and would not 
protect sensitive military judgments in suits brought by” civilians. Id. at 
1354. 
 
Evans v. Boyd Rest. Group, LLC, No. 06-15246, 2007 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 21995 (11th Cir. Sept. 12, 2007) 
QUESTION: “Whether an individual can assign her pre-judgment 
rights under Title VII.” Id. at 11. 
ANALYSIS: The court indicated that “[t]he novelty of this issue is 
what law governs its resolution,” but “because a cause of action for 
discrimination in violation of Title VII is not assignable under either 
Georgia or federal law, we need not decide which law applies.” Id. The 
court noted that both “Georgia and federal law provide the same rule 
regarding the assignment of claims for personal injuries.” Id. at 11–12. 
The court further recognized that “[t]he remedial scope of Title VII . . . 
makes it more similar to a personal injury tort action than an action to 
enforce contractual or property rights.” Id. at 12. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit concluded that “because actions 
arising under Title VII are not assignable, the district court did not err in 
declaring the assignment void.” Id. at 13. 
 
United States v. Mazarky, 499 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the term of imprisonment to be subtracted 
is that which was imposed upon a single revocation, or the aggregate of 
all prison terms imposed upon multiple revocations” in the interpretation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h), which “limits the maximum term of supervised 
release upon revocation.” Id. at 1249. 
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit noted that this issue had been 
addressed “in the relevant legislative history and in the 7th, 8th, and 2nd 
Circuits.” Id. The court recognized that the congressional explanation of 
an earlier bill described the phrase “any term of imprisonment” as the 
“aggregate of all prison terms served in prior revocations.” Id. The court 
examined relevant case law from other circuit courts that indicated 
“subsection (h) was intended to provide credit for the aggregate of prison 
terms served on prior revocations toward the maximum amount of 
supervised release permitted by statute.” Id. at 1250. 
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CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “under subsection (h) [of 
18 U.S.C. § 3583] the maximum allowable supervised release following 
multiple revocations must be reduced by the aggregate length of any 
terms of imprisonment that have been imposed upon revocation.”  Id. 
 
Cesar v. Att’y Gen., No. 06-15140, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 17267 (11th 
Cir. July 20, 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether an immigration court was limited to applying 
only those materials outlined in Taylor v. United States and Shepard v. 
United States when determining if a particular crime of violence was a 
crime of domestic violence under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). Id. at 1. 
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit analyzed the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Taylor v. United States and Shepard v. United States, in 
which the Supreme Court established that when determining the nature 
of a conviction, a court may look at only statutory elements, charging 
documents, jury instructions, written plea agreement, plea colloquy 
transcript, and any explicit factual findings of the trial court to which the 
defendant assented or otherwise adopted. Id. at 3. The court then 
examined the circuit split on the issue, as evidenced by the 7th Circuit’s 
decision in Flores v. Ashcroft and the 9th Circuit’s decision in Tokatly v. 
Ashcroft. Id. at 4. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit concluded that it did not need to 
reach a decision on the question of statutory interpretation, but also noted 
that if the court was limited to Taylor/Shepard limitations or materials, 
the outcome would remain unchanged. Id. at 4–5. 
 
United States v. Haun, 494 F.3d 1006, (11th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “Whether the Government must prove specific intent in 
order to obtain a conviction under 14 U.S.C. § 88(c).” Id. at 1008. 
ANALYSIS: The court emphasized that its statutory interpretation 
should focus on “the language of the statutes that Congress enacts”  
because it “provides ‘the most reliable evidence of . . . intent.’” Id. at 
1009. The court explained that “[c]riminal statutes, although they are to 
be strictly construed, ‘are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the 
obvious intention of Congress. . . . The rule of common sense must be 
applied to the construction of criminal statutes, the same as others.’” Id. 
at 1009–10. Examining the language of the House Committee Report 
discussing the bill that was later codified, the court concluded that the 
purpose of the statute was “to penalize those who cause the Coast Guard 
to become involved when no help is needed, regardless of whether the 
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individual who precipitated the drama in the open seas knew with 
certainty that the Coast Guard would needlessly answer the distress call.” 
Id. at 1010. Based on this interpretation the court concluded that “the use 
of the word ‘willfully’ in the statute does not mean that the Government 
must prove specific intent in order to obtain a conviction.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that [14 U.S.C. § 88(c)] “defines a 
general intent crime.” Id. 
 
Millennium Partners, L.P. v. Colmar Storage, LLC, 494 F.3d 1293 
(11th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
barred evidence of repairs made by persons other than the defendant. Id. 
at 1302. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained that “Rule 407 does not apply to a 
remedial measure that was taken without the voluntary participation of 
the defendant.” Id. The court then adopted the viewpoint of seven othr 
circuits that agreed such evidence was not barred. Id. at 1303. 
CONCLUSION: Joining seven other circuit courts of appeals, the 
11th Circuit held that Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not 
bar evidence of repairs made by persons other than the defendant. Id. 
 
Jones v. United Space Alliance, L.L.C., 494 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether Florida courts interpret Christiansburg 
Garment Co. v. EEOC (“Christiansburg”), to limit the application of 
Florida’s offer-of-judgment statute, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.79, in cases 
under Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 [FCRA], in a suit to recover 
attorneys’ fees. Id. at 1309.  
ANALYSIS: While the Eleventh Circuit initially recognized two 
issues of first impression, it concluded that Florida case law “limit[ed] 
the application of section 768.79 in state civil rights cases, [and 
therefore, the court] need not reach the merits of a Rule 68 preemption 
issue.” Id. The court noted that “[t]his circuit has found section 768.79 to 
be substantive law for Erie purposes.” Id. As a result, the court analyzed 
“Florida law to determine whether section 768.79 should be applied” in 
the instant case. Id. at 1310. The court opined that “[b]ecause the FCRA 
is modeled on Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964], Florida courts 
apply Title VII case law when they interpret the FCRA.” Id. Moreover, 
the court recognized, “[u]nder federal law, prevailing defendants cannot 
recover attorneys’ fees in Title VII cases unless the claim was ‘frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation.’” Id. The court further indicated 
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that Florida had “expressly adopted the Christiansburg standard for cases 
under the FCRA.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court determined “that Florida’s FCRA 
prevents the recovery of attorneys’ fees under section 768.79 by the 




Blue & Gold, Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the [government]’s procurement decision 
was ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with the law.’” Id. at 1312. 
ANALYSIS: The court found “that a party who has the opportunity 
to object to the terms of a government solicitation containing a patent 
error and fails to do so prior to the close of the bidding process waives its 
ability to raise the same objection subsequently in a bid protest action in 
the Court of Federal Claims.” Id. at 1313. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “the Court of Federal 
Claims properly [held] that Blue & Gold had failed to object in a timely 
fashion to the terms of the prospectus” and had waived its right to 
subsequently challenge the award of the government contract to another 
contractor. Id. at 1313, 1316. The court held that “[t]here was no error in 
holding for the defendants on Blue & Gold’s challenge pursuant to the 
Service Contract Act” and affirmed the decision of the Court of Federal 
Claims. Id. at 1316–17. 
 
Electrolux Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 491 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) 
QUESTION: Whether the special exception to filing a corporate tax 
refund claim under 26 U.S.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A) that was available when 
“the overpayment . . . was ‘attributable to . . . a carryback’ of net capital 
loss,” was also applicable to a carry forward loss. Id. at 1330. 
ANALYSIS: The court determined that while the relevant statutory 
language—“‘attributable to . . . a capital loss carryback’ . . . —is not 
defined . . . in the [Internal Revenue] Code and [does not have] special 
technical meaning under tax laws . . . .” the court noted that other courts 
“in various tax cases have construed the phrase according to its plain 
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meaning which is understood to be ‘due to, caused by or generated by.” 
Id. at 1330–31.  
CONCLUSION: The court held that when a plain meaning 
interpretation was applied to the section 6511(d)(2)(A) context, the 
special limitations exception was available for subsequent years only if 
overpayment was “due to, caused by, or generated by” a carryback of the 
long-term capital loss of the tax refund year at issue. Id. at 1333. 
 
 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
Holland v. Williams Mountain Coal Co., 496 F.3d 670 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether a district court abused its discretion when it 
awarded attorney’s fees to victorious defendants in a case involving the 
Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 (“Coal Act”), 26 
U.S.C. § 9701 et seq., while holding that the plaintiffs had acted in bad 
faith. Id. at 672–73. 
ANALYSIS: The court first addressed a legal theory at odds with 
prevailing law, articulating that “the fact that another jurisdiction has 
rejected a legal theory does not render it so devoid of merit as to make 
reliance on it an exercise in bad faith.” Id. at 674. The court then 
declared, “the problem with [the district court’s] analysis is that it 
assume[ed] the narrow . . . definitions of successors in interest.” Id. The 
court reasoned, “the very factual thread the district court discounted . . . 
might well have made the defendants successors in interest . . . under the 
broader, substantial continuity of operations test.” Id. Finally, the court 
noted that “given how often [the substantial continuity] test has been 
applied to analogous statutes in both this and other circuits, we [could ] 
not say that it was an act of bad faith for the [plaintiffs] to urge its 
application to the Coal Act.” Id. at 676. The court concluded “that it was 
reasonable for the [plaintiff]s to regard [the defendants] as successors in 
interest” and that “their decision not to sue [a potential defendant] cannot 
be taken as an indicator of bad faith.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court explained that “[t[his was not a case the 
plaintiffs ‘lost because [they] vainly pressed a position flatly at odds with 
the controlling case law,’ but rather one they ‘lost because an unsettled 
question’ as to which they had a reasonable position ‘was resolved 
unfavorably,” and thus, “[the district] court erred in finding the suit so 
meritless as to have been brought in bad faith requir[ing this court] to 
reverse the award as an abuse of discretion.” Id. 677. 
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Cambridge Holdings Group, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 489 F.3d 1356 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a defendant that has never been served is a 
‘party’ for purposes of [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] 54(b).” Id. at 
1360. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that eight circuits ‘“treat[ed] an 
improperly served defendant as never [having been] before the district 
court for purposes of Rule 54(b)” and “[n]one [have] adopted a contrary 
interpretation.” Id. The court reasoned that this position was the most 
logical interpretation of Rule 54(b) because “[t]he rule was enacted to 
codify ‘the historic rule in the federal courts’ prohibiting ‘piecemeal 
disposition of litigation’ by preventing an appeal in a case where 
litigation before the district court is ongoing.” Id. Therefore, the court 
explained that “when a district court dismisses a suit as to all served 
defendants and only one unserved defendant remains, there is . . . no 
reason to anticipate proceedings before the district court.” Id. at 1361. 
CONCLUSION: The D.C. Circuit adopted the view of its sister 
circuits to hold that an unserved defendant is not a “party” under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Id. 
 
Morrow v. Microsoft Corp, 499 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
QUESTION: Whether “bankruptcy or trust law relationships affect 
the standing analysis in a patent infringement case.” Id. at 1336. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “[a] patent is a bundle of rights 
which may be retained in whole or in part, divided and assigned.” Id. at 
1341. The court explained that although the trusts gained rights to the 
patent in question through the bankruptcy proceeding, the suit was filed 
pursuant to and governed by the patent laws. Id. at 1336. The court noted 
that patent statutes “govern the creation and protection of patent rights, 
how rights can be transferred, and the parties entitled to assert those 
rights.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “the patent statutes have 
long been recognized as the law that governs who has the right to bring 
suit for patent infringement, even when patent rights have been 
transferred as a result of bankruptcy or proceedings in equity.” Id. at 
1337. 
 
